DE LA FORMATION SCIENTIFIQUE DES FUTURS PSYCHOLOGUES

DE LA FORMATION SCIENTIFIQUE DES FUTURS PSYCHOLOGUES

 Jacques P. BEAUGRAN, PhD

 Département de Psychologie, Université du Québec à Montréal

    E-mail :  beaugrand.jacques@uqam.ca                                                        

Conférence présentée sur invitation à Oppinicon II: State of the Discipline psychology/L'état de la discipline psychologie. Octobre 1984. Oppinicon Lake, Ont. Can.

       La psychologie scientifique couvre un domaine de connaissances comportant des aspects fondamentaux, appliqués et technologiques. La psychologie fondamentale peut se caractériser, entre autres, par un domaine de connaissances composé d'entités réelles (systèmes nerveux individuels fonctionnels, sociosystèmes), problématiques (problèmes cognitifs concernant la nature et les lois du domaine) et méthodiques consistant exclusivement en procédures scruttables (vérifiables, analysables, critiquables) et justifiables (explicables), la méthode scientifique occupant la première place à cet égard. La formation et la formation des futurs chercheurs en psychologie devraient être similaires à celles offertes à tous les autres scientifiques des sciences physiques et biologiques. Comme pour d'autres sciences factuelles, les objectifs de la psychologie fondamentale incluent également la recherche et l'utilisation des lois de la nature, et son but suprême en tant que science est de comprendre la réalité. Une telle compréhension ne peut être obtenue qu'à l'aide des lois.

       La psychologie appliquée est l'utilisation des connaissances scientifiques (et des méthodes) pour étudier des problèmes dont la solution peut acquérir une importance pratique, par exemple pour les institutions, l'industrie et l'éducation. En ce sens, la psychologie appliquée ne découle pas automatiquement de la psychologie scientifique fondamentale. Faire de la psychologie appliquée, comme la psychologie de base, consiste à mener des recherches visant à acquérir de nouvelles connaissances. Les connaissances acquises ou dérivées de la psychologie fondamentale peuvent être utilisées dans ce processus, mais cela ne signifie pas que la recherche appliquée n'est qu'une application courante : la psychologie appliquée ne serait pas de la recherche proprement dite si elle ne produisait pas de nouvelles connaissances. Le scientifique appliqué exploite et enrichit les connaissances issues de la recherche fondamentale. On attend du scientifique appliqué qu'il fasse des découvertes, mais pas qu'il découvre des propriétés profondes ou des lois générales. Il/elle n'a pas l'intention de le faire. Il/elle a un objectif plus pratique, même s'il est à long terme. Son champ d'application ou domaine est donc également plus restreint que celui du scientifique fondamental. Par exemple, au lieu d'étudier l'apprentissage en général, le psychologue appliqué peut étudier l'apprentissage de l'inférence logique par les enfants à l'aide de microprocesseurs, en cherchant des moyens possibles d'améliorer leurs performances. La psychologie scientifique appliquée se situe entre la psychologie scientifique fondamentale et la technologie/intervention psychologique ou la psychotechnologie, mais leurs limites ne sont pas clairement définies. L'objectif de la psycho-intervention, qui inclut la psychiatrie, la clinique, le sport, l'industrie, le commercial, la guerre, ..., et la psychologie de l'éducation, est de contrôler et de changer la réalité par la conception et l'exécution de systèmes artificiels (c'est-à-dire des programmes d'intervention) et de plans d'action basés sur les connaissances scientifiques acquises grâce à la recherche fondamentale ou appliquée en psychologie. C'est orienté action, mais il reste scientifique tant qu'il utilise un peu de connaissances scientifiques. Jusqu'à présent, nous avons mentionné les bases® appliqué® Technologie : Avance des connaissances scientifiques. Mais il existe aussi un retour d'information dans le sens inverse : la psychologie appliquée scientifique fournit la psychologie fondamentale, et la psycho-intervention (psychotechnologie) fournit à la fois la recherche fondamentale et appliquée de nouveaux matériaux, contre-exemples, problèmes et la psycho-intervention est également justifiée de demander à expliquer pourquoi certaines propositions fonctionnent, bien qu'il faille d'abord démontrer qu'elles fonctionnent réellement ! Ces trois moments scientifiques forment un système de « production et circulation de connaissances, d'artefacts et de services » (Bunge, 1983).

       Un tel système scientifique capable d'évaluer ses connaissances et ses services est plus susceptible de diffuser des informations et d'offrir des services authentiques, c'est-à-dire au moins partiellement vrais, et précieux comparés à des pratiques déconnectées de leurs homologues scientifiques fondamentaux et appliqués. Méfiez-vous des fausses connaissances et des services bidons qui sont faux soit parce qu'ils font référence à des inexistants, soit parce qu'ils représentent des existants de manière totalement fauxe. Nous ne prétendons pas que la science détient le monopole de la vérité. Les annuaires téléphoniques de toute grande ville contiennent certainement plus de vérités que toutes les sciences comportementales réunies. Mais cela ne résulte pas d'un effort scientifique. Si la recherche scientifique poursuit la vérité, elle ne se caractérise pas par la vérité finale mais plutôt, entre autres traits importants, par la corrigibilité. Ce n'est pas le cas de la pseudoscience, qui est un ensemble de croyances soutenues face à l'absence de preuves, à l'absence d'explication scientifique alternative, ou même à des preuves négatives. C'est vrai, les pseudo-scientifiques, comme tous les autres mortels, peuvent accidentellement trouver de vraies hypothèses mais ne prennent même pas la peine de les étudier scientifiquement.

       Les programmes de psychologie dans nos universités visent à offrir une formation scientifique solide aux futurs psychologues, mais la pratique de la psychologie elle-même est trop souvent de la pseudoscience. En effet, la systématicité décrite est plus une fiction qu'une réalité dans plusieurs domaines de la psychologie. Le plus souvent, la partie technologique est complètement déconnectée des parties de base et appliquées. Cette dernière branche de la psychologie ne consiste pas à appliquer les connaissances, modèles, théories ou même méthodes testées par les premiers au domaine d'application spécifique. Elle est composée d'une communauté de croyants qui se qualifient de scientifiques ou du moins psychologues, bien qu'ils ne mènent aucune recherche scientifique ou technologique. La société d'accueil les soutient pour des raisons pratiques et par complaisance, ou par ignorance propre et la nôtre. Leur domaine contient des entités irréelles ou du moins non certifiées réelles, des entités ou processus immatériels, tels que des esprits désincarnés et des surmoi, et autres. Leur objectif est essentiellement pratique plutôt que cognitif et ils ne se préoccupent pas des objectifs typiques de la recherche scientifique, à savoir la découverte de lois et leur utilisation pour comprendre et prédire les faits. Au contraire, leur synthèse méthodique de procédures impossibles à vérifier par d'autres et leur épistémologie laisse place aux arguments de l'autorité et à des modes de cognition étranges accessibles uniquement aux initiés. Leur vision du monde est liée à la tradition et dogmatique plutôt qu'à la science ; Elle change très peu au fil du temps et, lorsqu'elle change, elle ne le fait que sur des aspects apparents, à la suite de controverses publiques et de pressions extérieures, plutôt que de recherches scientifiques réelles.

       Les pseudoscientifiques sont extrêmement dangereux pour la science car ils font passer des spéculations sauvages et des données incontrôlées pour obtenir des résultats de recherches scientifiques, déformant l'approche scientifique. En tant que membres du corps enseignant, ils apprécient souvent la popularité des jeunes étudiants parce que « c'est amusant et facile », alors que la véritable science est difficile et donc élitiste. Leur crédibilité publique vient du fait qu'ils ont étudié dans les mêmes programmes universitaires que de véritables scientifiques. En tant que professionnels, ils travaillent dans la même profession que de véritables praticiens scientifiques et sont reconnus par les mêmes entreprises. Nous devons mettre fin à une telle pratique dans notre profession. Dans le reste de cet article, nous examinerons brièvement quelques-uns des moyens disponibles pour atteindre cet objectif important.

       Une bonne voie est de rejeter les pratiques clairement pseudoscientifiques en psychologie. Les sujets et pratiques non scientifiques traditionnellement intégrés au programme psychologique devraient être immédiatement interdits dans la formation des futurs scientifiques de la psychologie. Au moins, éloignons les futurs scientifiques de l'obligation de recevoir une formation en sorcellerie lors de leur formation. La science et le dogme sont profondément incompatibles méthodologiquement. Ils n'occupent pas de territoires différents mais empiètent fréquemment les uns sur les autres et sont destinés à s'affronter à des moments critiques. Il est extrêmement important que les étudiants soient convaincus que la croyance sans preuves empiriques positives, accompagnée de l'appui de la majeure partie des connaissances scientifiques, n'est que dogme. Et le dogmatisme est incompatible avec la science et la technologie psychologiques. Par conséquent, quiconque souhaite former un élève cohérent et cohérent doit choisir soit le dogme, soit la science. Nous devons opter pour la science, sinon nous allons disparaître dans un avenir proche.

       Une fois que ces sujets et pratiques non scientifiques seront éliminés du programme, ils pourront être remplacés par des sujets scientifiques ou par des matières liées aux fondements, à la philosophie, à l'histoire des sciences et des technologies, à leurs relations avec la société ou à leurs applications en psychologie. Il est impératif de renouveler l'enseignement des sciences et de la technologie au niveau des programmes de psychologie, et d'augmenter le contenu scientifique de notre programme. Non seulement nous devons former des scientifiques en psychologie, mais il est aussi de notre devoir d'encourager la pleine participation de nos étudiants à la société technologique et de promouvoir leur adaptation aux nouveaux emplois créés pour les psychologues. Une autre façon de lutter contre la pseudoscience en psychologie est d'améliorer la qualité et l'universalité des sujets scientifiques enseignés aux futurs psychologues. Une liste des cours véritablement scientifiques proposés dans les programmes de psychologie se résume à l'étude de la méthode expérimentale et des techniques statistiques. Il faut ajouter plus d'informations sur la méthode générale des sciences, l'histoire des sciences, leur philosophie et leurs fondements. Il n'est pas vrai que la psychologie en tant que science soit différente des autres sciences. La même méthode de base est utilisée ; seul le domaine des objets auxquels elle est appliquée, ainsi que quelques techniques particulières, restent (en partie) spécifiques à la psychologie. Rejoignons franchement la grande famille des sciences.

       De plus, une perspective philosophique sur la psychologie est bienvenue à ce moment crucial du développement de la psychologie en tant que jeune science. Comme nous le savons tous, l'influence de la philosophie sur la psychologie a été extrêmement importante. Ce fut une motivation importante pour le béhaviorisme : non seulement la psychologie devait quitter le tablier préscientifique de la philosophie mère, mais elle devait aussi éradiquer tous les ingrédients philosophiques de l'étude du comportement. Les béhavioristes pensaient pouvoir obtenir ces effets en s'en tenant aux « faits positifs » et en s'abstenant de formuler toute hypothèse. Dans la mesure où le béhaviorisme a apporté une contribution significative à la psychologie, il n'a pas adhéré à son programme étroit d'esprit inspiré par le positivisme primitif. Beaucoup de concepts (c'est-à-dire le conditionnement et la sensibilisation) étaient à la mode, bien que définitivement trans-empiriques.

       Il est temps d'initier une réflexion philosophique sérieuse sur notre science, qui se poursuit lentement mais sûrement d'importantes adaptations et mutations, mais pas encore de manière paradigmatique. Ces réflexions serviront de perspective générale pour les prochaines décennies, rafraîchissent notre ontologie, notre épistémologie et notre éthique, et nous aideront à atteindre une plus grande maturité et reconnaissance scientifique.

       Le réalisme scientifique critique suggère d'abandonner l'ontologie tronquée proposée par le néobéhaviorisme pour un domaine plus authentique et naturel des faits, qui ne se limiterait pas au comportement manifeste, mais couvrirait tout aussi bien d'autres faits se produisant dans ou produits par le cerveau (ex : cognitifs). Nous devrions abandonner une conception immature de la connaissance scientifique qui rejette totalement l'explication et la théorisation, au profit d'une théorie adulte de la connaissance. À partir d'objectifs étroits d'esprit et d'une version raccourcie de la méthode scientifique, la psychologie devrait supposer des objectifs plus complets et ultimes, en utilisant la méthode scientifique de manière plus intégrale.

       La philosophie nous aidera probablement à reconnaître ontologiquement l'existence d'un niveau psychologique, enraciné dans l'activité neuronale et dans des niveaux plus profonds, mais possédant de nouvelles propriétés émergentes, soumises à leurs propres lois (psychologiques), à incorporer dans de véritables théories psychologiques et ainsi rendre compréhensible et prévisible par la science de la psychologie.

       Mais alors que nous attendons encore une nouvelle épistémologie pour la psychologie, la qualité de l'enseignement et de la formation des futurs scientifiques pourrait être améliorée en inventant de nouveaux cours didactiques et en rédigeant des manuels plus frais et plus universellement scientifiques pour les futurs scientifiques de la psychologie. Mais une manière sûre serait d'étudier des cas où la pertinence des sujets de base pour les sujets appliqués est claire et de montrer comment leur transformation en psychotechniques a été rendue possible. @ Comme quatrième solution, nous devons changer l'image publique de la psychologie. La tâche difficile de former des scientifiques en psychologie commence dès maintenant : sélectionner les étudiants qui rejoindront nos programmes. Mais nous ne pouvons sélectionner que les meilleurs parmi le groupe qui s'est auto-recruté en réponse à l'image de la psychologie que nous projetons (en tant que discipline) dans les universités et dans la société en général. Notre image n'est pas seulement floue mais aussi incohérente pour tout candidat ayant atteint un niveau formel de cognition. Les étudiants universitaires ne sont pas bien informés sur le fait que la psychologie est aussi une science. Ils viennent vers la psychologie parce qu'ils la perçoivent comme une science particulièrement douce et parce qu'obtenir un diplôme en psychologie est une manière honorable de devenir un aide socialement reconnu. Les étudiants que nous souhaitons suivre dans nos programmes de formation et devenir scientifiques en psychologie (fondamentale, appliquée et psychotechnologie) sont recrutés par d'autres sciences et technologies. Nous devons développer des moyens de recruter des jeunes dont les principaux intérêts sont les sciences et les technologies ; Cela peut être fait, comme suggéré ci-dessus, par des modifications importantes de notre programme académique réel (plus scientifique), mais aussi en permettant aux étudiants des sciences et technologies de passer plus facilement à la psychologie après l'obtention de leur B.Sc. ou même de leur master. Par exemple, il serait extrêmement apprécié qu'un passage plus facile existe entre l'informatique, les sciences physiologiques et la psychologie cognitive.

       L'image publique de la psychologie doit être modifiée même si l'état réel de l'art de la prestation de services psychologiques ne correspond pas exactement à ce que nous souhaiterions. Le public en général deviendra plus exigeant et la profession devra répondre aux nouvelles exigences. Les futurs psychologues valoriseront la science comme le type le plus élevé de connaissances sur la nature et la société, et donc comme le meilleur fondement pour un contrôle rationnel et efficace de la réalité lorsque cela est nécessaire.

 

RECOMMANDATIONS

R1.      Qu'un comité national pour la psychologie scientifique soit formé de manière permanente. Sa tâche principale sera de promouvoir la psychologie comme science dans les universités, les collèges et le grand public.

R2.      Que la CPA, soit directement, soit par son comité scientifique, demande officiellement à certains philosophes et scientifiques en psychologie de former un groupe d'étude spécial dont la tâche sera de formuler et de proposer une épistémologie moderne pour la psychologie. Son ontologie, sa théorie de la connaissance, ses objectifs problématiques et sa méthodologie doivent être abordés.

R3.      Que la CPA suggère aux départements de psychologie des universités canadiennes et aux sociétés professionnelles d'augmenter le contenu scientifique de la formation des futurs psychologues et que les sciences et technologies, ainsi que leur histoire et leurs implications pour la psychologie et la société, doivent être pleinement couvertes par des programmes de formation. De plus, les sciences devraient être enseignées de manière plus universelle, et non limitées à l'application de méthodes spécifiques à la psychologie.

R4.      Que le contenu scientifique des cours d'introduction en psychologie au niveau collégial soit augmenté et que les sujets de type définitivement humaniste soient considérablement réduits en importance dans ces cours. Les étudiants doivent apprendre que les solutions strictement humanistes en psychologie ne sont que temporaires et doivent être remplacées par des solutions scientifiques (mais néanmoins humanistes). Qu'un comité soit formé pour étudier le contenu des cours d'introduction en psychologie au niveau collégial.

R5.      Que les étudiants universitaires soient invités à suivre davantage de cours en sciences et technologies avant d'être admis dans des programmes de psychologie au niveau universitaire. Que ce prérequis sert de condition pour l'admission aux programmes de psychologie.

R6.      Que les pratiques pseudoscientifiques en psychologie soient publiquement dénoncées par les associations scientifiques et professionnelles, tout comme les fautes éthiques et professionnelles.

R7.      Que l'apprentissage de la recherche scientifique (fondamentale et appliquée) et de l'intervention psychologique soit effectué tandis que l'étudiant participe à des équipes de recherche et des cabinets privés capables de lui offrir une supervision compétente et un certain soutien financier.

R8.      Que la formation de premier cycle soit l'occasion pour les étudiants d'assimiler les trois dimensions de la psychologie scientifique, à savoir la recherche fondamentale, la recherche appliquée et la psychotechnologie (intervention).

R9.      Cette spécialisation en recherche fondamentale/appliquée ou en intervention ne se fait que pendant les études supérieures en psychologie. Cette spécialisation correspond à des profils de formation distincts et conduit à différents diplômes terminaux (Ph.D., D.Ps.).

R10.    Que l'importance de la maîtrise en psychologie (minimum deux années curriculaires, plus une thèse dans la plupart des universités québécoises françaises) soit grandement réduite afin de promouvoir que les études doctorales soient entreprises immédiatement après la fin de leurs études de premier cycle. L'importance du master peut être réduite en le rendant facultatif, servant uniquement de soupape de sécurité et de passage occasionnel d'un programme (ou d'un profil) à un autre. De plus, la maîtrise doit être reconnue comme insuffisante par les sociétés professionnelles (du Québec et du Nouveau-Brunswick) pour exercer le droit dans leurs provinces respectives. De plus, la thèse de master doit être abandonnée et le stage pratique fortement réduit pour faire partie de la formation doctorale.

R11.    Au niveau doctoral, que la formation à la recherche des futurs psycho-intervenants soit grandement réduite par rapport à ce qu'elle est actuellement dans les programmes de psychologie de type « scientifique-professionnel ». Elle doit être remplacée par une formation en psychotechnologie, à savoir par l'application des connaissances scientifiques à l'intervention, à la planification de l'intervention et à son contrôle par une mesure efficace des effets obtenus.

R12.    Que la recherche doctorale reste réservée aux chercheurs futurs en psychologie fondamentale et appliquée, mais que la thèse elle-même soit progressivement remplacée par des publications scientifiques.

 

RÉFÉRENCE

 Bunge, M. (1983). Épistémologie. Paris: Maloine. 

On the scientific formation of future psychologists

On the scientific formation of future psychologists

 

Jacques P. Beaugrand, professeur

 

Département de Psychologie,
Université du Québec à Montréal

 

 beaugrand.jacques@uqam.ca

 

                                                               

Conférence présentée sur invitation à Oppinicon II: State of the Discipline psychology/L'état de la discipline psychologie. Octobre 1984. Oppinicon Lake, Ont. Can.

 

       Scientific psychology covers a knowledge field having basic, applied, and technological aspects. Basic psychology can be characterized, among other things, by a domain of knowledge composed of real entities (functional individual nervous systems, sociosystems), problematic (cognitive problems concerning the nature and laws of the domain) and methodics consisting exclusively of scrutable (checkable, analysable, criticizable) and justifiable (explainable) procedures, the scientific method having the first place in that respect. The formation and training of future researchers in psychology should be like the one given to all other scientists in the physical and biological sciences. As for other factual sciences, the aims of basic psychology also include the search for, and the use of, laws of nature, and its supreme goal as a science is to understand reality. Such understanding can only be obtained with the use of laws.

       Applied psychology is the use of scientific knowledge (and methods) to investigate problems whose solution may acquire practical importance, e.g. for institutions, industry and education. In this sense, applied psychology does not follow automatically from basic scientific psychology. Doing applied psychology, like doing basic psychology, is conducting research aiming at acquiring new knowledge. Knowledge acquired or derived from basic psychology may be used in the process, but it does not entail from this that applied research is only a matter of routine application: applied psychology would not be research proper if it did not yield new knowledge. The applied scientist exploits and enriches knowledge that has been produced by basic research. The applied scientist is expected to make discoveries but not to uncover deep properties or general laws. He/she does not intend to. He/she has a more practical aim, even if it is a long term one. His/her scope or domain is thus also narrower than that of the basic scientist. For ex., instead of studying learning in general, the applied psychologist may study the learning of logical inference by children using microprocessors, with an eye on possible ways of improving their performance. Applied scientific psychology lies between basic scientific psychology and psychological technology/intervention or psychotechnology, but their borderlines are not neatly defined. The aim of psycho-intervention, which includes psychiatry, clinical, sport, industrial, commercial, war, ..., and educational psychology, is to control and change reality through the design and execution of artificial systems (i.e. intervention programs) and plans of action based on scientific knowledge gained through basic or applied psychology research. It is action oriented, but it is scientific as long as it uses some scientific knowledge. So far, we have mentioned the basic® applied® technology feed-forward of scientific knowledge. But there also exists feedback in the opposite direction: scientific applied psychology supplies basic psychology, and psycho-intervention (psychotechnology) supplies both basic and applied research with new materials, counterexamples, problems and psycho-intervention is also justified to ask to explain why certain proposal do work, although it must be shown first that they really work! These three moments of science form a system of "production and circulation of knowledge, artifacts and services" (Bunge, 1983).

       Such a scientific system capable of evaluation of its knowledge and of its services is more likely to circulate information and offer services that are genuine, i.e. at least partially true, and valuable when compared to practices which are disconnected from their basic and applied scientific counterparts. Beware of bogus knowledge and of phoney services which are, false either because they refer to non-existents or because they represent existents in an utterly false manner. We do not pretend that science has the monopoly of truth. The telephone directories of any large city contain certainly more true statements than all behavioural sciences put together. But these happen not to be the result of scientific endeavour. While scientific enquiry pursues truth, it is not characterized by final truth but rather by, among other important traits, corrigibility. This is not the case with pseudoscience which is a body of beliefs upheld in the face of either lack of evidence, absence of any alternate scientific explanation, or even negative evidence. True, pseudoscientists, like any other mortals can accidentally hit on true hypotheses but they do not bother to investigate them scientifically.

       Psychology programs in our universities aim at giving a sound scientific formation to future psychologists but the practice of psychology itself is too often pseudoscience. Indeed, the systemicity just described, is more a fiction than a reality in several fields of psychology. Most often the technological part is completely disconnected from the basic and applied ones. This latter branch of psychology is not the application of knowledge, models, theories or even methods tested by the formers to the specific domain of application. It is composed of a community of believers who call themselves scientists or at least psychologists although they do not conduct any scientific or technological research. The host society supports them for practical reasons and complaisance, or because of its own and our own ignorance. Their domain contains unreal or at least not certifiably real entities, immaterial entities or processes, such as disembodied minds and superegos, and the like. Their aim is essentially practical rather than cognitive and they are not concerned by the typical goals of scientific research, namely the finding of laws and their use to understand and predict facts. On the contrary, their methodic summarize to procedures that are not checkable by alternative ones and their epistemology makes room for the arguments from authority and for strange modes of cognition accessible only to initiates. Their view of the world is tradition-bound and dogmatic rather than scientific; it changes very little in the course of time and, when it happens to change, it does so only in apparent aspects as the result of public controversy and external pressure rather than genuine scientific research.

       Pseudoscientists are extremely dangerous to science because they pass wild speculation and uncontrolled data for results of scientific research, deform the scientific approach. As faculty members they often enjoy the popularity of young students because "it is fun and easy", whereas genuine science is hard and therefore elitist. Their public credibility comes from the fact that they have studied in the same faculty programs as genuine scientists. As professionals they work in the same profession together with genuine scientific practicians and that they are recognized by the same corporations. We have to put an end to such a practice in our profession. In the rest of this paper, we shall examine briefly some of the means at hand to attain this important objective.

       On way is to reject clearly pseudoscientific practices in psychology. Non-scientific topics and practices traditionally part of the psychological curriculum should be immediately banned from the formation of future scientists of psychology. At least, let us keep future scientists away from the obligation to receive training in sorcery during their formation. Science and dogma are deeply incompatible methodologically. They do not occupy different territories but encroach frequently with each other and are bound to clash at critical points. It is extremely important that students be convinced that belief without positive empirical evidence together with the support of the bulk of scientific knowledge is merely dogma. And dogmatism is incompatible with psychological science and technology. Therefore, whoever wishes to form a coherent and consistent student must opt either for dogma or science. We must opt for science or else we are going to get extinct in a near future.

       Once that non-scientific topics and practices are eliminated from the curriculum, they can be replaced by scientific ones or by subjects which are related to the foundations, philosophy, history of sciences and technologies, to their relations with society, or to their applications in psychology. It is imperative to renew the teaching of sciences and technology at the level of psychology programs, and to increase the scientific content of our curriculum. Not only do we have to form scientists in psychology, but it is also our duty to encourage the full participation of our students to the technological society and to promote their adaptation to new jobs created for psychologists. Another way of fighting pseudoscience in psychology is to improve the quality and universality of the scientific topics which are taught to future psychologists. A list of the truly scientific courses offered in the psychology programs boils down to the study of the experimental method and statistical techniques. More on the general method of science, the history of sciences, their philosophy and foundations should be added. It is not true that psychology as a science is different from other sciences. The same basic method is used; only the domain of objects to which it is applied, together with some special techniques, remain (partly) specific to psychology. Let us join frankly the great family of sciences.

       In addition, a philosophical perspective on psychology is welcome at this crucial moment in the development of psychology as a young science. As we all know, the influence of philosophy on psychology was extremely important. It was an important motivation for behaviorism: not only did psychology have to leave the prescientific apron-string of mother philosophy but it also had to eradicate all philosophical ingredients from the study of behaviour. Behaviorists believed that they could obtain these effects by sticking to "positive facts" and by refraining from any hypothesis formulation. In so far as behaviorism made some significant contribution to psychology, it did not stick to its narrow-minded program inspired by primitive positivism. A lot of concepts (i.e. conditioning and sensitization) were in vogue, although definitively trans-empirical.

       It is time to initiate a serious philosophical reflexion on our science which is slowly but surely ongoing important adaptations and mutations but not yet in any paradigmatic manner. These reflexions are to serve as a general outlook for the next decades and refresh our ontology, epistemology and ethos, and help us obtain greater scientific maturity and recognition.

       Critical scientific realism suggests us to abandon the truncated ontology proposed by neo-behaviorism for a more authentic and natural domain of facts, which would not be restricted to overt behaviour, but would as well cover other facts occurring in or produced by, the brain (ex: cognitive ones). We should abandon an immature conception of scientific knowledge which rejects explanation and theorizing altogether, for and adult theory of knowledge. From narrow minded objectives and a shortened version of the scientific method psychology should assume more complete and ultimate objectives, using the scientific method in a more integral manner.

       Philosophy will probably help us to recognize ontologically the existence of a psychological level, rooted in neural activity and in deeper levels, but having new and emergent properties, subjected to their own (psychological) laws, to be incorporated into truly psychological theories and thus made understandable and predictable by the science of psychology.

       But while we are still waiting for a new epistemology for psychology, the quality of the teaching and training of future scientists could be improved by inventing new didacticals and by writing fresher and more universally scientific handbooks for the future scientists of psychology. But a sure way would be to study cases where the relevance of basic topics for applied ones is clear and to show how their transformation into psychotechniques was rendered possible. @ As a fourth solution, we have to change the public image of psychology. The difficult task of forming scientists in psychology begins right now of selecting the students who will enter our programs. But we can only select the best ones from the group that self-recruited in response to the image of psychology we (as a discipline) project in colleges and in society in general. Our image is not only fuzzy but incoherent to any candidate having attained a formal level of cognition. College students are not well informed about the fact that psychology is also a science. They come to psychology because they perceive it as an especially soft science and because obtaining a diploma in psychology is an honourable way to become a socially recognized helper. The students who we would like to follow our programs of formation and to become scientists in psychology (basic, applied, and psychotechnology) are recruited by other sciences and technologies. We have to develop means to recruit young people whose major interests are for the sciences and technologies; this can be done, as suggested above, through important modifications of our actual academic curriculum (more scientific), but also by allowing students of the sciences and technologies to more easily switch to psychology after the completion of their B.Sc. or even master's degree. For example, it would be extremely welcome for an easier passage to exist between the computer, physiological sciences and cognitive psychology.

       The public image of psychology has to be changed even if the actual state of the art of giving psychological services does not correspond exactly to what we would like it to be. The public in general will become more demanding and the profession will have to meet the new requirements. Future psychologists will value science as the highest type of knowledge about nature and society, and therefore as the best ground for the rational and effective control of reality when necessary.

  

RECOMMENDATIONS

R1.      That a national comity for scientific psychology be formed on a permanent base. Its main task will be to promote psychology as a science in universities, colleges and in the public.

R2.      That the CPA, either directly or through its scientific comity, ask officially some philosophers and scientists in psychology to form a special study group whose task will be to formulate and to propose a modern epistemology for psychology. Its ontology, its theory of knowledge, its problematic, objectives and methodics should be covered.

R3.      That the CPA suggest to the psychology departments of Canadian universities and to the professional corporations that the scientific content of the formation of future psychologists be increased and that sciences and technologies as well as their history and implications for psychology and society have to be fully covered by programs of formation. In addition, sciences should be taught in a more universal manner, not to be restricted to the application of specific methods to psychology.

R4.      That the scientific content of introductory courses in psychology at the collegial level be increased and that topics of the definitively humanistic type be greatly reduced in importance in these courses. Students must learn that strictly humanistic solutions in psychology are only of the temporary type and have to be replaced by scientific (but still humanistic) ones. That a comity be formed to study the content of introductory courses in psychology at the collegial level.

R5.      That college students be asked to follow more courses in the sciences and technologies before being admitted in psychology programs at the university level. That this prerequisite serves as a condition for admittance in psychology programs.

R6.      That pseudoscientific practices in psychology be publicly denounced by scientific and professional associations, just as ethical and professional faults are.

R7.      That the apprenticeship of scientific research (basic and applied) and of psycho-intervention be carried out while the student participates to research teams and private practices capable of giving him/her competent supervision and some financial support.

R8.      That the undergraduate formation be the occasion for students to assimilate the three dimensions of scientific psychology, namely basic research, applied research, and psychotechnology (intervention).

R9.      That specialization into either basic/applied research or intervention occurs only during the graduate studies in psychology. That this specialization corresponds to distinct formation profiles and lead to different terminal diplomas (Ph.D., D.Ps.).

R10.    That the importance of the master's degree in psychology (minimum of two curricular years, plus a dissertation in most Québec French universities) be greatly reduced to promote that doctoral studies be undertaken by the students immediately after the conclusion of their undergraduate studies. The importance of the master's degree can be reduced by having it become facultative, serving only as a safety valve and as an occasional passage from one program (or profile) to another. Also, the master's degree has to recognized as insufficient by the professional corporations (of Quebec and of New Brunswick) for legal practice in their respective provinces. In addition, the master's dissertation has to be abandoned, and the practicum greatly reduced, to become part of the doctoral formation.

R11.    At the doctoral level, that the research training of future psycho-interveners be greatly reduced comparatively to what it is presently in psychology programs of the "scientific-professional" type. It has to be replaced by training in psychotechnology, namely by the application of scientific knowledge to intervention, to the planning of intervention and to its control by efficient measurement of the obtained effects.

R12.    That the doctoral research remains only for future researchers in basic and applied psychology but that the thesis itself be gradually replaced by scientific publication.

REFERENCE

 

Bunge, M. (1983). Épistémologie. Paris: Maloine. 

Contre la chasse près des zones habitées

CONTRE LA CHASSE PRÈS DES ZONES URBAINES

Jacques P. BEAUGRAND

beaugrand.jacques@uqam.ca

    La chasse sous toute ses formes devrait être interdite dans les régions peuplées du Québec. C'est une activité immorale qui devrait être bannie de notre civilisation, Elle est immorale parcequ'elle présente le double caractère d'être à la fois cruelle pour les animaux et non nécessaire pour l'homme occidental. L'utilisation des armes à feu dans les régions peuplées du Québec prive aussi toute une catégorie de citoyens de promenades en forêt ou à proximité. 

    L'humain occidental n'a plus besoin d'avoir recours à la chasse pour subvenir à ses besoins alimentaires et à ceux des siens. Il peut à volonté reproduire des espèces sélectionnées pour leur qualités alimentaires; il se permet ensuite de les abattre pour sa consommation, mais dans des conditions très réglementées qui évitent la surproduction, assurent la qualité et l'hygiène des aliments qui sont ainsi produits, mais aussi qui empêchent que les animaux ne souffrent inutilement. C'est ce dernier aspect qui nous intéressera ici particulièrement. Ainsi, en vertu du Règlement sur l'abattage sans cruauté (code criminel 1978, c.937.( 4) on s'assurera de rendre rapidement inconscient l'animal avant de l'abattre; ou encore, la mise-à-mort elle-même consistera à rendre disfonctionnel le système nerveux qui en temps normal a pour fonction d'élaborer le phénomène subjectif que constitue la souffrance chez l'animal. Que dire alors de la chasse «sportive» telle qu'elle se pratique dans notre société ? C'est une activité non seulement barbare, mais perverse. Le chasseur recherche délibérément et crée des occasions qui lui procurent jouissance par la cruauté et la souffrance qu'il inflige (inutilement) aux proies qu'il «stresse», traque, blesse, emprisonne, mutile ou tue. Le plus souvent, la jouissance est «ennoblie» du fait que l'animal est terrassé sur son propre territoire: on se plaît à énoncer que l'animal, étant en terrain familier, peut facilement se «défendre». Cet argument est simpliste quand on connaît la sédentarité que développent la majorités des espèces une fois fixées sur un territoire. Au contraire, il est plus facile de les abattre sur leur propre territoire qu'elles tenteront de défendre contre l'intrus, même celui armé d'un fusil. Une autre façon de donner à la chasse du panache est de l'associer à une activité que pratiquaient, jadis, la noblesse. L'idée de justifier la chasse par son caractère «royal» est particulièrement rétrograde si l'on considère ce 200e anniversaire de la Révolution Française qui a été l'occasion pour nos ancêtres les Français de «déposer» la tête royale avec encore trop de souffrances inutiles. Autre temps, autre moeurs. D'un point de vue moral, on n'a pas le droit d'obtenir par la chasse une telle jouissance aux dépens des autres espèces animales (Déclaration universelle des droits de l'animal, UNESCO, 1978). La chasse est clairement une activi té immorale parce qu'il ne s'agit plus d'une activité de subsistance, comme celle que pratiquent encore les peuples autochtones, mais bien d'une activité uniquement orientée vers la jouissance que certains qualifieront volontiers de sadique. Hélas, les mentalités sont difficiles à changer. L'une des raisons est que la chasse est une activité très lucrative pour l'état. Le fait que celui-ci l'encourage et l'aménage, malgré le fait qu'elle soit clairement immorale, est tout à fait honteux. Le fait qu'elle soit transformée en une activité «rationnelle» par des collègues biologistes, et en activité «sportive» par les journalistes est pour le reste aussi révoltant.

    Quant à associer la chasse à «l'amour de la nature», cela relève du  grotesque et de l'ignorance. L'activité qui consiste à tirer plaisir en traquant les animaux pour éventuellement les tuer sans besoin de subsistance est radicalement incompatible avec celle qui consiste à aimer la nature, à l'admirer, à la respecter, à la préserver, à la cultiver. Il me semble impossible qu'un individu rationnel puisse prétendre tirer plaisir de la destruction d'une chose et de sa conservation à moins d'être cognitivement perturbé.

    Ceci étant dit sur la chasse dite «sportive», comment alors qualifier cette activité qui consiste à libérer des animaux domestiques, inexpérimentés et sans défense, et à les abattre à bout portant ? C'est non seulement une activité vile et barbare mais aussi clairement criminelle. En effet, le législateur a depuis longtemps reconnu le caractère criminel d'une telle activité dans son article 402, paragraphe (1). Cette loi est malheureusement peu connue du public. Les alinéas a) c) d), f) et g) de l'article 402 sont particulièrement explicites:

«(1). [Faire souffrir inutilement un animal] Commet une infraction quiconque a) volontairement cause, ou s'il en est le propriétaire, volontairement permet que soit causée, à un animal ou un oiseau, une douleur, souffrance ou blessure sans nécessité; (b) .. c) étant le propriétaire ou la personne qui a la garde ou le contrôle de l'animal ou oiseau domestique ou d'un animal ou oiseau sauvage en captivité, l'abandonne en détresse ou volontairement néglige ou omet de lui fournir aliments, l'eau, l'abri et les soins convenables et suffisants, d) de quelque façon encourage à battre ou à harceler des animaux ou des oiseaux ou y aide ou assiste; (e) .. f) organise, prépare, dirige, facilite quelque réunion, concours, exposition, divertissement, exercice, démonstration ou événement au cours duquel des oiseaux captifs sont mis en liberté avec la main ou par une trappe, un dispositif ou autre moyen pour essuyer un coup de feu au moment de leur libération, ou y prend part ou reçoit de l'argent à cet égard, ou g) étant propriétaire ou l'occupant, ou la personne ayant la charge de quelque local, permet que ce local soit utilisé en totalité ou en partie pour une fin mentionnée à l'alinéa f)».

Comme mentionné dans L'Oeil régional du 21 mai dernier, les coups de feu tirés à moins de 50 mètres des résidences sont particulièrement désagréables pour des riverains qui se sont établis dans la région pour profiter des beautés et du calme de ce qui reste de la nature montérégienne. Les plombs frôlent aussi les habitations et au moins un rapport de police à été fait à ce sujet. Tirer du fusil si près des habitations est en soi une activité hautement dangereuse, en plus d'être nettement de mauvais goût. Un dommage irréparable est aussi causé à nos enfants qui sont particulièrement sensibles à la contradiction. Comment en effet leur apprendre à aimer et à préserver la nature, alors que des voisins, qu'ils perçoivent autrement comme tout à fait respectables, prennent un malin plaisir à la détruire et à «tirer sur tout ce qui bouge» ?

On comprend mal par conséquent que de paisibles citoyens aient à entreprendre des démarches auprès de leurs députés pour qu'une telle activité cesse. Le simple fait que la municipalité de St-Charles-sur-Richelieu où est située l'île, de même que les riverains de cette chasse, ne désirent pas la tenue d'un champ de tir à proximité de leur propriété, devrait suffire dans une société civilisée comme la nôtre pour que son organisateur y mette fin «en bon voisin et en bon père de famille».

Le lecteur ou la lectrice est prié-e de ne pas hésiter à contacter le soussigné pour une action concertée dans ce dossier. Le jour où la chasse ne sera plus organisée sur l'Ile aux Cerfs, c'est bien volontiers que nous irons festoyer aux trois tilleuils de Saint-Marc, mais pas avant.

====

La chasse "sportive" est une activité immorale [*] à plusieurs points de vue.

1. La chasse pratiquée dans les régions urbaines prive des citoyens non chasseurs du légitime plaisir de profiter en paix de la belle nature automnale sans avoir constamment peur d'être pris accidentellement comme cible, ou d'être atteints par des balles perdues.

2. Les chasseurs ne respectent pas la propriété privée et détériorent le bien privé et public; ils sont fréquemment la source d'altercations avec les propriétaires ou avec ceux qui veulent profiter de la forêt.

3. La chasse est cruelle pour les animaux qu'elle fait souffrir et mutile inutilement. Puisque l'homme moderne ne tire plus sa subsistance de la chasse, il n'a aucune justification de tuer des animaux dans des conditions qui souvent sont pitoyables.

Dès 1978, l'UNESCO, dans sa "Déclaration universelle des droits de l'animal" indiquait que d'un point de vue moral, l'humain n'a pas le droit d'obtenir par la chasse une telle jouissance aux dépens des autres espèces animales.

4. La manipulation des armes de chasse cause de nombreux accidents conduisant à des blessures graves, et à mort d'homme.

5. La chasse justifie la prolifération des armes et du savoir à propos de leur utilisation. Une arme à feu donne un sentiment de puissance à celui qui la manipule et cette connaissance encouragera son détenteur à en généraliser l'utilisation dans sa vie sociale pour régler des conflits familiaux ou de voisinage, ou à des fins économiques (i.e., banditisme).

Une société qui encourage la chasse encourage aussi indirectement la criminalité.

L'arme de chasse est aussi un instrument de meurtre et de suicide significatif.

6. L'utilisation des armes pour la chasse empêche un meilleur contrôle des armes à feu dans notre société. Si toutes les armes étaient obligatoirement déposées dans des reposoirs sous supervision policière, des centaines de vies seraient sauvées chaque année, et des centaines de mutilations évitées. La libre circulation des armes implique des coûts importants pour notre société.

7. La chasse est une activité perverse puisqu'elle ne sert plus à la subsistance du chasseur, mais au plaisir égoïste que celui-ci tire en débusquant, traquant et en le mettant à mort un animal. Comment un chasseur peut-il prétendre aimer les animaux s'il tire un pervers plaisir à les tuer ? [Note 1]

8. La chasse conduit souvent lieu au braconnage et au saccage complet d'une population à des fins économiques. Il y a de nombreux précédents partout dans le monde. En France, la dernière ourse de souche pyrénéenne, "Cannelle", a été tuée lundi par un chasseur lors d'une battue aux sangliers en vallée d'Aspe.

9. La chasse est une activité incompatible avec le respect de la nature et des autres espèces animales. Nous constituons une espèce animale très intelligente; néanmoins, nous sommes uniquement l'émergence d'un assemblage particulier d'ADN, comme toutes les autres espèces vivantes par ailleurs. Comportons-nous de manière morale. [Note 2]

10. La chasse est une activité primitive et barbare. Elle n'a rien de noble. Elle témoigne d'une ignorance certaine, et d'une attitude archaïque et grotesque. Le fait que les chasseurs s'empressent de redistribuer le produit de leur chasse, est probablement un signe de culpabilité. De nombreuses activités pourtant bien naturelles et très "instinctives" furent réprimées au cours de notre évolution biologique et culturelle vers Homo sapiens. Il devrait en être ainsi de la chasse. [Note 3]

11. Les animaux sauvages sont aussi potentiellement des vecteurs de maladies dont plusieurs sont transmissibles à l'homme ou à aux animaux de la ferme. Pour tout dire nous n'en savons pas grand chose mais nos voisins du Sud croient que l'encéphalopathie spongiforme (maladie de la "vache" folle) est fréquente chez les cervidés. [Note 4]

12. La chasse n'est pas justifiable par l'état de nos connaissances sur les communautés écologiques et leur équilibre. En fait nous ne savons pas grand chose sur les relations très complexes qu'entretiennent les espèces d'un écosystème. Pourquoi jouer aux apprentis sorciers ?

13. La chasse n'est pas justifiable par le fait qu'elle enrichit les coffres de l'état et les marchands de fusils, et fasse vivre des fonctionnaires et employés de l'état, y compris des biologistes de la faune.

14. La chasse sportive cause aussi un préjudice irréparable aux enfants qui sont particulièrement sensibles à la contradiction. Comment, en effet, comme parents et éducateurs apprendre à nos enfants à aimer et à préserver la nature, si en temps de chasse nous prenons malin plaisir à détruire cette même nature en "tirant sur tout ce qui bouge".

15. Quant à la chasse "Roue du Roy" qui consiste à libérer des animaux pour que des chasseurs leur tire dessus, c'est une activité tout simplement criminelle. En effet, le législateur a depuis longtemps reconnu le caractère criminel d'une telle activité dans son article 402, paragraphe (1). Cette loi est malheureusement peu connue du public. L'État ne prend pas ses responsabilités ici en appliquant ses propres lois. [Note 5]

16. Notre société est nettement en contradiction en ce qui concerne la chasse. D'une part elle exige des conditions d'élevage et d'abattage extrêmement rigoureuses pour les animaux de la boratoire, et pour l'élevage servant à l'alimentation, et d'autre part elle fait la promotion de la chasse qui est une source très importante (et inutile) de souffrance animale (pensons aux animaux uniquement blessés) et d'une viande dont les qualités sont rarement contrôlées. [Note 6]

 

Que faut-il faire ?

• Interdire toute chasse dans les zones urbaines. Par ex., au Québec, interdire la chasse au Sud du 47e parallèle et à l'Ouest du 70e méridien. Laissons cette zone à ceux qui aiment vraiment la nature.

• En ce qui concerne le nombre de chasseurs, il faut laisser agir l'attrition, le désintéressement dans la population. Chaque année il y a proportionnellement de moins en moins de ventes de permis de chasse. Le gouvernement --qui représente aussi les non-chasseurs - n'a pas à faire la promotion de la chasse et à implanter des programmes de stimulation de la chasse -- comme celui de permettre la chasse accompagnée à partir de l'âge de 12 ans ! --

• Que l'école enseigne aux jeunes que la chasse est une activité barbare, à faire disparaître de notre culture.

• Que les chroniqueurs qui se disent écologistes ne fassent plus l'éloge de cette activité qui n'a plus sa place dans une société vraiment civilisée.

• Remplacer la venaison sauvage par celle d'un élevage contrôlé. La plupart des espèces s'élèvent en captivité, ou dans des conditions de semi-captivité.

 

Notes:

[*] La morale concerne les règles de conduite à l'égard des congénères (de la même espèce, i.e., les autres humains), de même qu'à l'égard des autres espèces avec lesquelles nous partageons l'ADN.

[1] Associer la chasse à "l'amour de la nature" relève du grotesque. L'activité qui consiste à tirer son vil plaisir à traquer des animaux sans défense pour éventuellement les tuer sans que ce soit pour satisfaire à un besoin de subsistance est radicalement incompatible avec celle qui consiste à aimer la nature, à l'admirer, à la respecter, à la préserver, à la cultiver. Il me semble impossible qu'un individu cohérent sur le plan rationnel puisse tirer du plaisir à la fois de la destruction d'une chose et de sa conservation, à moins d'être cognitivement perturbé.

[2] Ne chassons plus nos frères les animaux. Ils souffrent comme nous. Ils font partie avec nous de la diversité de la vie. Ils sont essentiels à l'équilibre écologique dont nous faisons partie intégrante. Ironiquement, une fois que les humains se seront tous entretués (par cupidité et méchanceté), certains de ces animaux pourront évoluer vers des espèces très intelligentes, comme nous le sommes aujourd'hui.

[3] Le plaisir de traquer et de tuer du gibier est sans doute archaïque. Partager la viande comme le font encore les tribus primitives (e.g., Yanomami et !Kung), sans doute aussi. Le fait que les chasseurs soient à ce point généreux à distribuer leurs prises au retour de la chasse semble indiquer "je me sens coupable et je me dégoûte d'avoir tué sans justification ce pauvre animal, et veuillez me pardonner cet acte de barbarisme ancestral; en acceptant de partager cette viande, acceptez-vous de partager ma culpabilité devant ce carnage inutile". Bien des chasseurs (et pêcheurs) admettent ne pas consommer leurs prises. Leur "plaisir" semble inhérent à l'activité de chasse/pêche elle-même, plutôt que dans celui de déguster du gibier. À moins que ce ne soit un vestige archaïque de l'époque où nos ancêtres partageaient le produit de leur chasse avec les autres membres du clan ...

[4] Toucher, transporter et manger du gibier n'est pas sans danger. C'est un mythe que de croire que tout ce qui vient de la nature est pur, propre et bon pour la consommation. Chaque année, on abat à titre préventif des centaines d'animaux (surtout des wapitis et des bisons) qui semblent atteints de brucellose, de peur qu'ils la communiquent aux animaux de ferme. Le Wapiti et Cerf de Virginie sont susceptibles à l'encéphalopathie spongiforme (maladie de la "vache" folle) (Chronic Wasting Disease), transmissible à l'homme et aux animaux domestiques, en particulier si le chasseur visite une ferme. On ne sait pas si manger de la venaison contaminée peut transmettre le prion à l'homme. Le Cerf de Virginie est de plus un vecteur de diffusion de la tique qui transmet la maladie de Lyme à l'homme.

[5] Comment alors qualifier cette activité qui consiste à libérer des animaux domestiques, inexpérimentés et sans défense, et à les abattre à bout portant ? Ces chasses " organisées " aussi appelées " Roue du Roy " constituent non seulement une activité vile et barbare, mais aussi clairement criminelle. En effet, le législateur a depuis longtemps reconnu le caractère criminel d'une telle activité dans son article 402, paragraphe (1). Cette loi est malheureusement peu connue du public. Les alinéas a) c) d), f) et g) de l'article 402 sont particulièrement explicites:

"(1). [Faire souffrir inutilement un animal] Commet une infraction quiconque a) volontairement cause, ou s'il en est le propriétaire, volontairement permet que soit causée, à un animal ou un oiseau, une douleur, souffrance ou blessure sans nécessité; (b).. c) étant le propriétaire ou la personne qui a la garde ou le contrôle de l'animal ou oiseau domestique ou d'un animal ou oiseau sauvage en captivité, l'abandonne en détresse ou volontairement néglige ou omet de lui fournir aliments, l'eau, l'abri et les soins convenables et suffisants, d) de quelque façon encourage à battre ou à harceler des animaux ou des oiseaux ou y aide ou assiste; (e).. f) organise, prépare, dirige, facilite quelque réunion, concours, exposition, divertissement, exercice, démonstration ou événement au cours duquel des oiseaux captifs sont mis en liberté avec la main ou par une trappe, un dispositif ou autre moyen pour essuyer un coup de feu au moment de leur libération, ou y prend part ou reçoit de l'argent à cet égard, ou g) étant propriétaire ou l'occupant, ou la personne ayant la charge de quelque local, permet que ce local soit utilisé en totalité ou en partie pour une fin mentionnée à l'alinéa f)".

[6] L'humain peut aujourd'hui à volonté reproduire des espèces sélectionnées pour leurs qualités alimentaires; il peut se permettre ensuite de les abattre pour sa consommation, mais dans des conditions très réglementées, qui évitent la surproduction, assurent la qualité et l'hygiène des aliments qui sont ainsi produits, mais aussi qui empêchent que les animaux ne souffrent inutilement. Ainsi, en vertu du Règlement sur l'abattage sans cruauté (code criminel 1978, c.937.(4) " on s'assurera de rendre rapidement inconscient l'animal avant de l'abattre; ou encore, la mise à mort elle-même consistera à rendre dysfonctionnel le système nerveux qui en temps normal a pour fonction d'élaborer le phénomène subjectif que constitue la souffrance chez l'animal ". Or, comment notre société peut-elle d'une main imposer des règles si strictes aux conditions d'abattage et d'euthanasie des animaux servant à l'alimentation et à la recherche, et d'une autre main encourager ses citoyens, voire les enfants, à pratiquer un sport barbare qui consiste à donner la mort à des bêtes dans des conditions de souffrance pitoyables. Cette incohérence s'explique par le fait que la chasse est une activité très lucrative pour bien du monde, depuis les fabricants d'armes et de munitions, les employés des parcs et " réservoirs " fauniques, jusqu'à l'État lui-même. Le fait que notre État encourage la chasse sportive et l'aménage, malgré le fait qu'elle soit clairement immorale, est tout à fait honteux pour une société qui se dit civilisée. Le fait qu'elle soit transformée en une activité "rationnelle" par des collègues biologistes, et en activité "sportive" par les journalistes est pour le reste aussi incompréhensible.

[7] Il ne faut pas croire les chasseurs qui vous diront qu'ils trouvent pénibles d'abattre une bête. La plupart des chasseurs vous confieront tirer d'abord plaisir (satisfaction) lors de la capture ou de l'immobilisation, puis ressentir une certaine culpabilité. Les amérindiens ne demandent-ils pas pardon à la bête avant de donner le coup fatal?

[8] Les données fournies par la psychologie évolutive et l'éthologie indiquent que la chasse est une activité masculine, modulée par la testostérone. Chez les peuples anciens et nos ancêtres elle était pratiquée par les hommes. Les meilleurs chasseurs étaient (et sont toujours chez les peuples primitifs) les chefs du clan ou de la tribu. Les femmes quant à elles faisaient la cueillette (qui n'est pas partagée sauf dans la famille immédiate). La chasse semble sous le contrôle des mêmes circuits neuronaux que la colère, l'agressivité, le meurtre d'opposants ou de rivaux, de même que guerroyer.

SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION OF BEHAVIOUR

 

SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION OF BEHAVIOUR

 

© Jacques P. BEAUGRAND 

beaugrand.jacques@uqam.ca

Version 3.1

 

Plan of this text

ABSENCE OF UNEQUIVOCAL TERMINOLOGY

BEHAVIOUR: A VERY BROAD CONCEPT

CRITERIA OF DESCRIPTION AND CLASSIFICATION

A. Concrete criteria 

a) Classification according to form

b) Classification according to effects

B. Theoretical and abstract criteria

a) Classification according to cause

b) Classification according to function

 

CHOICE AND DEFINITION OF UNITS

A. Choice of units

B. Definition of Units

C. Repetitions and transitions

 

THE DESIGN OF OBSERVATION

A. The choice of taxonomy

B. Recording of temporal elements

C. Methods of recording

D. Encoding and Notation Systems

E. Complete and continuous observation as opposed to sampling

F. Back-up techniques

G. The degree of generalisation

H. Factors to be controlled

a) Effects due to observer interference

b) Expectations of subjects or observers

c) Instrumental decay

d) Example

 

SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

A. Non-structured or ad libitum sampling

B. Complete and continuous sampling

C. Sampling by successive focalisation

D. Sampling in Sequence

E. Sampling by presence or absence

F. Sampling by instantaneous scanning

G. Matrix completion

H. Choice of a technique

I. Instrumental accuracy

 

 

APPENDIX

Agonistic and epigamic behaviours of Xiphophorus helleri

 

REFERENCES

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS CONCEPTS RELATED TO SOCIAL SPACE IN ANIMALS

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS CONCEPTS
RELATED TO SOCIAL SPACE IN ANIMALS. 

Jacques P. BEAUGRAND  

E-mail: beaugrand.jacques@uqam.ca

 

ABSTRACT

Concepts of personal sphere, space, distance and field are pure metaphors and do not have any scientific value because they fail to point to concrete entities. These concepts must be swept from ethological thinking and replaced by concrete measurement of physical distances and by experiments carried out on the social, ecological, cognitive mechanisms controlling proximities in animals. Concepts of home range and territory point to concrete relational entities existing within an area defined by a set of objects in geometrical relations with each other, and a subject (individual, pair or group of animals) also sustaining specific relations with objects situated within that area. The specification of the territory requires also the existence of relations between the territory holder(s) and other individual(s) in reference to which defence, exclusive use and putative reversibility can be defined. Although a distinction can be made, in principle, between the concepts of home range and territory, in practice most authors use the terms in an interchangeable manner. The concept of territoriality (or territorialism) is a fuzzy concept, difficult to apply. It is not merely descriptive but carries a whole implicit theory about the functions of preprogrammed intolerance and mutual exclusion of congeners. The concept can be further defined but it becomes restricted in scope to extreme cases. Territoriality is a qualitative variable not rich enough to take into account the great diversity of patterns of spacing found in animals. Territoriality is usually meant to point to patterns of social distancing, defence of an area, isolation (on territory) and these patterns come in degrees. They are parts of a sociosystem which is the result of a balance of cooperation (mutuality) between group members that tends to social and spatiotemporal cohesion and proximity, and competition between them, that contributes to social differentiation and to spatiotemporal incompatibility (i.e. dispersion by distancing, isolation and territorialism). Intraspecific plasticity and the grading of dominance and territorial systems can be understood in the light of such a sociosystemic approach. Variations within a species and among species in the use of space and its defence can be quantified using activity fields, isolation fields and aggression fields (Waser and Wiley, 1979); proximities can be analysed using multidimensional scaling. Ethologists should rather stick to the more objective use of inter‑individual distances. Both in applied and fundamental ethology, precise measures of distances and proximities are needed. 

INTRODUCTION

Science takes space and time for granted, so much that space and time coordinates are used as independent variables. We can admit that space and time are not self-existing objects but a network of relations among factual items, things and their changes: space is an order of possible co‑existents and time an order of successive (Leibniz, 1956). In other words, the thing space is nothing but the collection of spaced things, or the set of things related by their mutual separations. So, strictly speaking, one speaks of space in a conventional manner and, a fortiori there is no such thing as a social space.

Applied and basic ethology are not preoccupied by space in itself, but by separation or contact between individuals or objects as the result of animal activity and behaviour. The concept of social space which has recently appeared in the ethological vocabulary has to be understood as referring to a very general spatial framework in which separation, distance, proximity or even contacts between individuals, or between them and valued objects, are the result of control behaviour aiming at searching or restricting proximity and contact. Although distances are truly physical distances, measurable in terms of physical units, they are qualified of social, because they are maintained and brought up by social behaviour.

Social space can be used as a very broad concept referring to any area delimited by familiar objects or defined in reference to the concerned subject(s), the intrusion of which area may or may not be tolerated according to the social context or may even be searched in certain circumstances. In the first case, excessive approach within a minimum distance that an animal attempts to keep between itself and others, or between some valuable resource and other, congeners can trigger behaviour having for consequence to put more distance between them. In this sense, the concept of social space covers more traditional concepts used by ethologists to qualify and describe patterns of space use in animals, including the already well encrusted but nevertheless problematic concepts of home range, territory and territoriality. Though these concepts are of a very limited application in studies carried out in battery cages and other industrial settings, they nevertheless still contribute to the background of such studies. The concept of social space also covers the less known concepts of personal sphere, space, distance and field. These concepts concern the portable space of interacting individuals and are en vogue among ethologists because their illusory relevance to applied and restricted settings when compared to concepts such as home range and territory which have evolved from ethological studies carried out on free ranging animals. 

In any case, in order to be valid, scientific concepts such as the ones at hand must have a definite connotation, and their extensional vagueness must also be kept minimal.

Ethology, which is an empirical science, is particularly interested in concepts referring to concrete (though perhaps hypothetical) existents. Not all constructs occurring in factual science have factual reference. Logical concepts such as "not" and "set" have no such reference. But concepts which are meant by scientists to refer to concrete things (i.e., which are not solely formal objects) must at least have the possibility to exist on their own, i.e., independently of their being perceived or conceived by the researcher. Otherwise, they contribute to untestable theories about ghosts.

The present paper is mainly concerned with a critical examination of the concepts just mentioned which are related to the use of space in animals. After having very briefly reviewed the essentials of each concept, we will examine their logical coherence, scientific validity and usefulness in applied settings. The study of spacing in animals can also be undertaken by adopting a sociosystemic perspective: active monitoring by individuals of proximity or distance between them and other congeners becomes understandable in terms of cooperation and competition which contribute to the formation of more or less connected social structures. Adopting such an approach can de‑emphasize the importance of territoriality in accounting for spatial patterns. Such an approach is presented in the appendix. The measurement of concrete distances between individuals and of differential occupation or frequentation of sites by individuals remains the basic scientific operations from which all concepts related to the use of space gain their support. Some quantitative instruments, mainly due to Waser and Wiley (1979), for the specification of obtained patterns of spacing among individuals and between groups are for that purpose introduced in the second part of this paper.

REVIEW OF THE MAIN CONCEPTS AND CRITICAL EXAMINATION

Portable individual space and related concepts

The tendency of animals to space relative to congeners is an extremely general feature of social behaviour. Individuals keep their distance from each other as if there existed a critical distance, a sphere or bubble surrounding each individual and moving with him. The intrusion or penetration of the restricted area can trigger behaviour, sometimes of the aggressive type, having for consequence to restore a more respectable inter-individual distance. The regular spacing of birds perched on a roof or wire illustrates the existence of a minimal distance that can be tolerated between two individuals of the same species, but at the same time a search for proximity. That stimuli releasing aggression are never simply those from congeners, but always include an inter-individual distance component reinforces this idea of a restricted personal space. Alternately, some animals may be free to enter such areas under some occasions but not on others. Individuals of one species that keep their distance during the day may huddle at night, or on especially cold days. Males may tolerate the proximity of females and juveniles but be intolerant to the approach from other males in the group. Nevertheless, sociability in animals is evidenced by individuals not distributing evenly when allowed to disperse over an area of uniform quality, and by having a definite tendency to aggregate and to synchronize their activities. 

Several concepts were proposed by Hediger (1941, 1955) and McBride (1971) to take into account these regularities. McBride (1971) has proposed that each solitary individual or isolated affiliated group on its home range maintained and defended a personal sphere by preventing others using the same area from approaching within a certain distance in any direction. This personal sphere would be portable with the individual or affiliated group. For McBride (1971), "this is the home range system, where an undefended range is used, but only the portable personal sphere is defended against intrusion". When the species concerned lives in groups, or is a gregarious one, spacing is still present within the group, with individual maintaining personal fields (McBride, 1971) and avoiding entering the fields of neighbours. The personal field was originally called a social force field by McBride (1964). According to him, these personal fields do not necessarily have an equal radius in each direction as do the personal spheres, but are, for poultry at least, well developed directly in front of the face. This was demonstrated in a flock of domestic hens, where most of the birds' movements were concerned with avoiding the personal fields of dominant neighbours (McBride et al., 1963). The spacing of the heads was more regular than it would have been under random spacing and birds seemed to avoid each other's facial aspect. To "simplify" terminology, the concept of personal area was proposed by McBride (1971) to refer to either the personal spheres or fields.

The concept of personal distance was also introduced by McBride (1971) and it was meant to refer to the distance from an animal to the limit of its field or sphere. Another concept, individual distance can be found in Hediger (1941, 1955), McBride (1971) and Conder (1949), to refer to the minimum distance that an animal routinely keeps between itself and other members of the same species. Each species would have a characteristic minimum distance that can be measured when animals are not on their territories. The animal would enforce the spacing by either retreating from the encroaching neighbour or by threatening it away. Individual distance is not to be confused with another concept, the flight distance, defined as the minimum distance an animal will allow a predator to approach before moving away (Hediger, 1950).

The concept of social distance was defined by Hediger (1963) as the maximum distance an animal will move away from its group of belonging. Gregarious animals normally live in a living space situated between the personal fields of neighbours and within social distance. Basically, it is then the observance of these two distances which gives, according to McBride (1971), the characteristic spatial architecture to a group of animals in any period of their life. Wilson (1975) and Zayan et al. (1983) do not respect the original meaning given by Hediger (1963) to social distance and they use it in the sense of (inter‑)individual distance, a concept that was previously defined. 

What is the scientific status of these concepts? Concepts such as personal field, personal sphere, personal area and distance, as used by McBride (1971) and Hediger (1963), do not refer to concrete entities. They are concepts conceived to schematize recurrent patterns implying that individuals seek or avoid contact with each other, or control proximity. But, evidently, there is no such physical or biological thing as a personal space, field or sphere moving around with the individual. These are metaphors. Even their authors were perfectly aware that they were proposing analogies. But users tend to ignore this and use these concepts as if they referred to real things. For McBride (McBride et al., 1963) it seemed clear from the kind of evidence presented above from poultry that the presence of another individual constitutes a social force on its neighbours. But the word force was used by McBride to mean that there was a measurable effect on behaviour of neighbours, that it diminished with distance and was maximum directly in front of the head. A possible analogy proposed by McBride was then to compare this gradient with the fields of magnetic force associated with a single pole of a magnet. But the use of the term field borrowed from physics had the implication that there exist things (and what things?) like physical fields of force; but it did not give any indication concerning the nature, structure, and the measurement of the field itself.  The analogy is not fruitful for ethology because it does not cover the original concept, does not suggest either fruitful new problems, except the futile challenge of finding ways to test for the existence of ghosts and to measure them, and cannot be assimilated by a scientific theory of any sort. These concepts give the appearance of a scientific approach, but their virtue is, alas, to cover our conceptual indigence.

The use of superficial analogies is also dangerous. It is that under apparently innocuous schemata are left buried deeper explanations which are now absolutely essential for understanding animal spacing and to solve husbandry and welfare problems. For example, it hinders the recognition that distances maintained between individuals, which can be measured concretely, vary greatly according to the recent histories of the encountering individuals, as well as to the context in which the encounter occurs.

Enough metaphorical comments have been made in the literature concerning the so‑called causes of personal distance, field or sphere, namely, perception of a conspecific as being too close or too far, behaviour towards a conspecific where proximity is tolerated or refused (Zayan et al., 1983). These mechanisms have to be studied and clearly identified when possible. If they remain unobservable, a theory about them and capable of accounting for these observed regularities has to be worked out and tested in the search for deeper regularities.

Simply sticking names on superficial regularities may be satisfactory for descriptive and taxonomic purposes, which was the principal programme of early ethologists. But, modern ethological science aims at understanding spacing mechanisms, their ontogeny and evolutionary history and this knowledge is of primordial importance for sound behavioural intervention and rationale engineering of rearing conditions in zoos and industrial settings. Deeper regularities are to be searched for.

The concept of individual distance as defined by Hediger and McBride, suffers from comparable shortcomings. As used by these authors, the concept of individual distance implies for them a mechanism of segregation explaining the minimum distance that is actively kept between two individuals. It supposes the existence of a critical distance, a minimum distance that an animal attempts to keep between itself and other congeners, the trespassing of which can trigger aggression. These assumptions could be part of a whole theory accounting for regularities observed in the spacing out and selective occupation of area. However, the present author is not aware that such a theory was ever articulated. Moreover, the concept of individual distance cannot be used simply as a key‑word referring to a whole series of mechanisms, since it could only refer to the results of these mechanisms. It could at most be used as a purely theoretical concept, in a manner similar to the concepts of mean and variance in the statistical language, to characterize patterns of recurrence within the spacing of individuals. The concept of individual distance, as Hediger and McBride accept it, is again a pure metaphor, not pointing to a concrete entity, and not used as theoretical schemata. It has no descriptive value, let alone an explanatory one. Such typical and regular distances effectively maintained between congeners, are the things to be explained, not explanations in themselves.

Moreover, individual distance, if used in this last acceptation, is simply a misnomer (Zayan et al., 1983): distance is, by definition, a relation between two points or individuals and not an  intrinsic property or state. Being a relational variable of different entities holding different positions, distance is inter-individual. The concept of (inter‑) individual distance could be more useful if it simply referred to the measurable distance between two individuals, without any reference to specific typical value for each subject.

 The concepts of home range, territory, and territoriality

 The home range

Nearly every animal spends its life in a circumscribed area, called its home range, except while dispersing or migrating. In field studies, home ranges are mapped by following an animal or group of animals about and plotting their movements on a map or by plotting the various locations where they have been sighted. The outermost points on such a map are then connected to form the smallest possible convex polygon, which is operationally considered the home range. Home ranges seem to have internal structure. Some parts fulfil habitat requirements better than others, and animal movements reflect this heterogeneity. Areas of intensive use, or core area, are centred around sleeping sites, high quality food patches, and water points, and nesting sites, which are the principal resources required by the animal. The home range of many animals, particularly mammals, consist of relatively few core areas interconnected by a network of narrow pathways.

One metrical problem with home range is that when polygonal maps of such home ranges are drawn from field observations, the ranges of neighbour animals or groups often appear to overlap, except for the core‑area. Home range maps based on polygonal or elliptical methods do not convey a true picture of how space is being used. Some authors have tried to circumvent the problem by obtaining convex polygons for different criteria of frequency‑use (Dunn and Gipson, 1977; Michener, 1979, 1981; Anderson, 1982; Bowen, 1982; Bekoff and Wells, 1982). For example, Bekoff and Wells (1982) calculated the geometric centre for each coyote of their study and obtained different polygons representing the area encompassed (outward from the geometric centre) by 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, and 95% of the total locations as well as the area defined by all (100%) locations at which individuals had been sighted. Another way to circumvent such problems is to conceptualize home range simply as an objective activity field (Waser and Wiley, 1979) or as a space use map or plot. These concepts are to be covered in a forthcoming section of this paper.

The concept of home range has been applied to free ranging animals such as the sheep (Hunter and Davies, 1963) and the feral domestic fowl (McBride et al., 1969). But it is evidently not very relevant for welfare studies carried out in restricted or industrial environments.

The territory and territoriality concepts

In the earliest accounts, a territory was recognized as the locus of positions in which a resident animal won agonistic encounters. When a territorial individual met an opponent beyond this locus, it either had to retrieve against another territorial individual itself in a situation of residence, or the issue was left unpredictable (Howard, 1920; Nice, 1941). This was most obvious when there was aggression manifested against intruders. However, in many instances it is believed that animals maintain exclusive areas by less overt behaviour. Many carnivorous mammals avoid each other by detecting the presence of scents deposited by resident individuals and may very rarely or even never meet.

The definition of the territory seems to pose a real problem to the ethologist. A variety of definitions of the territory and of territoriality have been proposed. Definitions of either fall in two broad categories, whether they refer or not to the behavioural mechanisms by which exclusiveness or at least non‑random distribution of space is obtained.

Here are some examples: "A territory is any defended area" (Noble, 1939); a territory is an "exclusive area" (Schoener, 1968) or a "fixed, exclusive area with the presence of defence that keeps out rivals" (Brown and Orians, 1970); territorialism is "defence of a resource by fighting or displays" (Krebs and Davies, 1981).

Some definitions do not refer to behavioural mechanisms; they are of the ecological type. For instance, Pitelka (1959) emphasized that territory is primarily an ecological phenomenon, and defines it as "an exclusive area, not merely a defended one...". Pitelka was primarily concerned with the economic functions of territory, namely by the exclusive use of resources contained by the territory, and the dispersion of competitors; he dismissed as irrelevant the mechanisms by which exclusiveness is maintained. A similar definition was recently proposed by Davies (1978) who recognizes the existence of a territory "whenever individual animals or groups are spaced out more than would be expected from a random occupation of suitable habitats".

To these complementary points of view adds a third one concerning the function of territories. For example, despite the apparent diversity of territorial behaviour, Wilson (1975) maintains that its function is simply to defend a particular resource. The adoption of this functionalist approach allowed him to recognize five major types of territory.

Type A. The "all purpose" territory. This is a large, defended area within which sheltering, courtship, mating, nesting, and most food gathering activities occur (e.g., benthic fishes, arboreal lizards, insectivorous birds, some small mammals).

Type B. The breeding territory. It is a large defended area within which all breeding activities take place but which is not the site for most food gathering (e.g., night-jars, reed warblers).

Type C. Nest defence territory. A small defended area around the nest of colonial birds (e.g., ibises, herons, gannets).

Type D. Mating territories and leks. Pairing and/or mating territories having a seasonal character (e.g., dragonflies, lek birds, Uganda kob).

Type E. "Home" territory. These territories are centred around roosting and shelter locations (e.g., bird dormitories, roosting place in the domestic pigeon).

Such a classification fails to grasp the full range of variability that exists. Some of the dimensions along which territorial forms of organization can be said to vary are the following: individual territory versus pair or group territory; defended versus non‑defended territory; exclusive versus non‑exclusive occupancy; feeding versus non‑feeding territory; mating versus non‑mating territory; rearing young versus non‑rearing; fixed versus floating territories.

For several authors, the home range includes the territory which, in this case, corresponds to the core area of the home range. For others, the basic distinction relies in the fact that the home range is not defended when intruded, while the territory is. Finally, for McBride et al. (1969) the territory and home range of feral fowl can perfectly overlap in some cases, depending on the phase or reproductive state in which the animals are at a given period of the year. 

 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION

    The concepts of home range and territory refer to concrete entities but, these well encrusted concepts are not used without causing major conceptual problems which boil down to their lack of sharpness. In addition, the concept of territoriality shows much ambiguity. 
    As a first consequence, there is practical confusion when it comes to report factual observations concerning the home ranges and the territories of individual animals or groups of animals.

    Although most authors agree with a distinction of principle between the home range and the territory, when it comes to distinguish between them in the field, it is failure. The home range and the territory are one and the same, the terms being used in an interchangeable manner. When one of these spatial system is reported there is a possibility that the use of the term home range or territory is simply arbitrary. Moreover, investigators have a clear tendency to be inclusive and do not hesitate to reduce all activities to territorial ones, as if pruning down to the home range at an early stage of a research project could lead to the loss of some important knowledge for posterity.

A distinction of principle can easily be established between these two concepts. Both have concrete connotations and are factually referential. The home range and territory are composed of sets of physical or biological objects in physical relation with each others, delimiting a "space" which can be three‑dimensional. For the ethologist, both the home range and the territory correspond to some piece of land, area over water, volume in the forest or in the sea, in which the individual animal, pair or group of animals spend most of their time at a given period of their life. But, specifying the home range does not require that the area be defended and whether or not it is of exclusive use. It is simply a concept accounting for special (e.g. frequentation) relations that an individual (or group) entertains with a given area.

 The home range can be represented by a triplet accounting for 1) a set of physical objects in spatial relation with each other and defining a spatial reference frame (i.e, the "space"); 2) a subject animal, pair or group of animals frequenting the home range; 3) a set of relations bounding the individual (or pair, or group) to some physical objects situated within the spatial reference frame. A comparative criterion of some kind can be used to decide whether one locus is part of the home range or not. 

Specification of the territory is more complex. It requires, in addition to the elements already required to specify the home range, an element of comparison between individuals of the same species. In order word, the territory is an area with which an individual (or group) enjoys privileged connections when compared to other areas as well as other individuals. Usually, we say that the area or space is defended or else used in an exclusive fashion by its owner(s).  Defence and/or exclusive use, which are special kinds of social relations, can only be defined with reference with other individuals of the same species (if, evidently, intraspecific territoriality is concerned).

So, in order to make a scheme of the territory, two terms must be added to the triplet modelling the home range: a fourth term must be used to represent other individuals in competition for the same space, and a fifth term to represent social (and anti‑social) bounding relations existing between the territorial individual (pair or group) and other competing ones.

The terms home range and territory be used in a more rigorous fashion. The term home range should be restricted to the designation of an area whose map corresponds to some criterion of frequentation obtained by valid sampling of the positions of the individual, or by duration of frequentation of the various space units in which the whole area of study has been partitioned. But, since by essence home range is a range, information about the structure of space utilization cannot be conveyed fully. Even the application of successive criteria for area encompassing various percentages of the locations frequented by the animal cannot deliver rich information about how the animal uses the total available area. In addition, since the concept of home range is of totally irrelevant use in welfare studies carried out in restricted and industrial environments, and even of poor application to free ranging domestic animals, the present author suggests to abandon the home range concept in favour of Waser and Wiley's (1979) activity field which will be covered in the second section of this paper.

      To this difficulty of distinguishing between the home range and the territory coincides another problem concerning the vagueness and ambiguity of the concepts of territory and of territoriality, which justifies the next section.

Attempt to elucidate the concept of territoriality 

Brown and Orians (1970) have suggested that Noble's definition of territory as showed much flexibility by its simplicity, and most ethologists adhere to this simple definition of the territory as any defended area.

 It is very deceiving to realize that some concepts in ethology get their strengths from fuzziness, ambiguity and over applicability. As is the case with the definition of dominance, the simplest definition in terms of aggressive interactions may not be the most useful one for a becoming science.

Clarification and sharpening of the concept of territoriality or territorial behaviour and territory are badly required. It seems logical to the present author that clarification of the concept of territoriality has to be completed before that of the territory. After all, the map of the territory, although very rarely drawn, can only be obtained after having recognized a series of loci where some state of affair, duly qualifying as territoriality, has been obtained.

Elucidation of the concept of territoriality can be done by interpretation: what does territoriality mean in a given context, what does it stand for, i.e. what is its designatum?  The intention of the concept of territoriality is the set of properties characterizing living beings showing (in their behaviour) territoriality, e.g. site tenacity, advertisement, overt defence, successful exclusion of intruders and exclusive use. The extension of territoriality is the set of territorial living beings.

But, while trying to elucidate the concept, one realizes that territoriality is not always the mere conclusion that an animal shows precise properties. Although it should be that kind of conclusion, territoriality is also a concept related to the motivation of behaviour and thus of the level of the explanation, rather than of a purely descriptive one. The concept seems to have acquired an explanatory value in itself. In this case, a theory about preprogrammed intolerance and mutual exclusion of congeners, basic individual and reproductive space needs, and the like, is mistaken for a concept summarizing the (hypothesized) behavioural manifestations of these, namely territoriality.  As for many other concepts in ethology (e.g. at the taxonomical level), the concept of territoriality is supported by an implicit theory about its teleonomical function or selective value of being territorial.

To elucidate or to sharpen the meaning of territoriality one can increase its earmarks. Ambiguity and vagueness can be reduced if the terms are further defined. But definitions cannot, of course, eliminate whatever ambiguity and vagueness there is in the primitive symbols. For instance, one has to choose the primitives.

Recent contributions from sociobiology and eco‑ethology have shed new lights on the evolutionary origins of several forms of social organizations, including territorial ones. However, by proposing different primitive concepts for explaining sociobiological regularities they have also contributed to create in the animal behavioural sciences a momentary state of ambiguity and confusion, because primitive concepts and mechanisms belonging to different levels of reality were alternately and sometimes simultaneously proposed to explain a given regularity. A choice must be made between the primitive concepts corresponding to different levels of reality.

The intuitive idea about levels is simple: the things at any given level are composed of things belonging to the preceding levels. Thus ecosystems are composed of populations, which are composed of organisms, which are composed of organs, which are composed of cells, which are composed of organelles, which are composed of molecules, which are composed of atoms, which are composed of so‑called elementary particles. Each level has its own laws, rooted into laws of the preceding ones. For example, the behavioural level, behaviour being the action of individual organisms participating to sociosystems, constitutes a level of reality ontologically anterior to the ecological level, in the sense that behavioural or ethological laws support ecological regularities or laws. Levels cannot act upon another. In particular, the higher levels cannot command or even obey the lower ones. So, all talk of inter‑level action is elliptical or metaphorical, not literal. 

To be consistent with such an ontological principle, one has to select a given level of discourse. With reference to territoriality, basic ethology has mainly relied on behavioural propositions, not demographic or ecological ones, and the regularities they study are special productions of the CNS, namely behaviours. This is not to say that individual organisms are not influenced by fluctuating elements of their environment. But the laws producing such demographic and ecological fluctuations are surely not the ones that could also cause changes in the behaviour of the organisms under study.

So, at the ecological level, spacing out patterns of populations not conforming to a random occupation of suitable habitats may or may not be called territoriality by ecologists; it is a question of ecological terminology. While some cases of non‑random occupation can be explained by behavioural territoriality, other cases of non‑random distribution can surely also be explained by some alternate behavioural mechanism, e.g. social attraction, pace Davies (1979).

True territoriality, when defined in terms of behavioural events, requires that stringent conditions be satisfied in order to eliminate rival explanations. That one individual successfully chases an intruder from an area can be explained by differences in familiarity with the given area, prior residence, differences in size and strength, the expression of an already established dominance relation between the pair members, individual recognition, &c, and is thus not a sufficient condition to declare that territoriality is at work.

Five behavioural criteria must be realized conjointly in order to declare that true territoriality is present: First, individuals must show site tenacity to a given area. This is to distinguish territoriality from mere personal defence when approached, or from the defence of a valuable mobile resource such as a mate, a young, a food item that happens to be in the area. Second, there must be defence of the site (Noble, 1939). The proposition to defend a site is more easily said than shown. It is in itself non‑observational and has to be constructed, by the interpretation of the raw empirical data, into a theoretical proposition. When we say that an individual animal defends a given space we implicitly declare that the individual residing within a given space manifests aggressive behaviour toward a category of congeners considered as intruders, and that it has for result (at least in a majority or modal number of cases) that intruders leave the defended space while the resident stays. It is not at all desirable to add any speculation about the "intentions" of the defender, which are not verifiable publicly. These conditions have to be strictly realized in the observations to be in a position to declare that one individual defends a given area. The question, however, remains whether a fixed space was defended, or only an area set in relation to a more or less mobile defender or defended valued object (e.g. mate, nest, young). A third condition for the existence of true territoriality is that the individual's presence in the area be advertised. Overt defence (attacking, chasing intruders) or display identifies the site holder and makes him conspicuous to rivals (Brown and Orians, 1970). A fourth condition for the existence of territoriality is that the territorial animal putatively excludes potential competitors from the defended area. The holder (an individual, a pair, a family or a whole group of animals) must have exclusive use of the defended area (Emlen, 1957). Finally, as fifth condition for true territoriality, putative reversibility of exclusion must occur when the resident becomes an intruder for an adjacent site‑holding conspecific (Tinbergen, 1953; DeBoer and Heuts, 1973; Zayan, 1974). In the fish Hemichromis bimaculatus, territorial defence could be induced at will by alternatively provoking intrusion into each of two fish's residence area (DeBoer and Heuts, 1973). This specific‑area‑linked dominance has to be realized in order to declare the existence of true territoriality in a given situation. In several species of fish the present author as tested, including Xiphophorus helleri, Salvelinus fontinalis, Trichogaster trichopterus, reversibility cannot be obtained. Zayan has also failed to show reversibility in the domestic fowl in experimental conditions.

The application of such strict criteria for true territoriality sharpens the concept but has for inevitable consequence to greatly reduce its scope. True territoriality, as defined from these earmarks, becomes restricted to extreme situations, and probably very rare ones.

What happens with other cases in which one or more of the above-mentioned conditions were not satisfied? Are these also manifestations of territoriality? The answer is no.  The concept of territoriality refer to a global property that is qualitative, i.e. the concept refers to a property variable taking a value of 0 when not territorial or 1 when territorial. Intuitively and in the everyday use, the concept of territoriality is used to cover various patterns of social distancing, territorial defence, isolation (on territory) and appropriation or defence of resources momentarily fixed both in space and time. As rigorously defined above, the qualitative concept of territoriality is surely inappropriate to account for such a variability.

A possible avenue to explore as a solution would be to consider the properties used to define the concept of territoriality as variables. These "qualities", the concept is supposed to cover in the everyday ethological language, can be found realized to various degrees in nature. They exist in determinate amounts and in space‑time as characteristics of the relations animals have with each others and with objects in their environment. True territoriality, as defined above, would correspond to the conjoint and full covering of these variables but in their extreme value. But, situations where only partial and incomplete covering of the criteria is obtained should not qualify as territoriality and should simply be referred to as social spacing or preferably social distancing, which are more generic concepts referring to a continuum of realities of which territoriality would be a special case.

Applied ethologists are much concerned by space requirements in terms of properties of habitats and proximity of congeners. The concept of territoriality is simply not relevant for intensive situations in which ethologists try to solve welfare and productions problems. True, territoriality in the weak sense of a defended area has been reported in older bulls (Kilgour and Campin, 1973) and Soay sheep (Grubb, 1974) but these are the very rare cases reported. Even so, overt aggression observed in these cases and interpreted in terms of defence of the area could well be explained by other factors.

  It is obvious that an investigation of spacing obtained by social behaviour can no longer be reduced to the naturalistic tenet that individual areas are basically the result of territorial control (Zayan et al., 1983). 

    Spacing systems are part of social systems. As stressed by Zayan et al. (1983), spatial relations are full components of social systems and should be discussed in the light of cooperation and competition which are the basic forces fashioning social systems, a view already announced in McBride (1971), and that we have presented in Appendix A. 

Conclusion

The conclusion is methodological. Ethologists should measure more often. Precise measures of distance, especially between individuals, are badly needed. In the field of animal welfare, specific evaluations of physical space can be made, e.g. cage dimensions and actual distances between cage mates. Needless to say, a full account of social space requires that both the behavioural and cognitive processes of spacing be also investigated. Concepts such as personal space, personal sphere and fields have to be discarded as potentially useful for the science of behaviour. The concept of home‑range can be used to refer to a map obtained from the transposition over a geographical representation of an area, of objective and specific measures of frequentation of the various loci (or quadrats) that are part of the area. However, the territory is more difficult to delineate or to characterize. In principle, the concept of territory can be used to refer to a map obtained in a similar fashion for points or loci neatly satisfying the criteria of territoriality. However, we have seen that the concept of territoriality is a fuzzy concept, and as used in the ethological literature, difficult to apply. These concepts are not rich enough to cover most cases of space use and their too more or less rigorous application in research cultivate the danger of concealing, under apparent conceptual conformity, mechanisms that have highly different evolutionary origins. On the other hand, those concepts related to the mobile individual space are analogies and furnish only a very superficial schematization. They should be replaced by more profound explanations, based on the cognition and experience of the individual animal and grounded by concrete the measurements of distances between individuals among themselves, distances between individuals and valued resources, and of use of specific sites.  Waser and Wiley (1979) have proposed to abandon the search for a unitary definition of territoriality, and instead, to address the variation among species in relationships of aggression, isolation, and activity fields, which are measures of space utilization, showing more flexibility, coming in degrees and thus more readily quantifiable. These concepts, which are of the metrical level, can be used to substantiate theoretical concepts, serve as indices for them or, as more usually said, serve to render them operational. A concept of spacing, defined in terms of site frequentation, exclusive access, site defence and inter-individual distance, would have the definite advantage of being in a position to refer to graded properties of social systems and thus to be represented by magnitudes or quantities.

APPENDIX A

 

QUANTIFICATORS

Activity field

 The distribution of an individual's time as a function of location. The word "field" is used by these authors in its mathematical acceptation as a function of position in space measured in a rectangular coordinate system. The value of an individual's activity field at any point is the proportion of time spent there in all activities. If the position of the individual is sampled at regular intervals, then the value at a given point is the proportion of samples in which the individual was noted being there.  The easiest way to obtain such a distribution is to superimpose a grid over the presumed home range, pasture, battery cage or fish tank. Continuous data and instantaneously sampled data have been transformed into maps of intensity of frequentation by noting tracks left in sand traps, by direct observation and tabulation, by computer using photos taken at regular intervals and read over a digitizing tablet, or animals directly followed with the aid of joy‑sticks, paddles and other convenient computer devices. Detailed activity maps can thus be rapidly and efficiently obtained for each individual in a group, for adjacent cage or territory holders, for whole groups of animals. The boundaries of this field can be taken to delimit the individual's home range or activity space, but without losing essential information about the structure of frequentation of localities and network of pathways. Alternatively, such a field could include only particular activities of importance to resource use, for example time spent foraging. An activity field pertaining to an individual's use of a particular resource is sometimes called an utilization distribution as suggested by van Winkle (1975). One major problem is to decide of the proper quadrat size; this question is discussed by Waser and Wiley (1979).

Isolation field

The relative exclusiveness of an individual's use of space as a function of location further defines an isolation field (Waser and Wiley, 1979). The value of an individual's isolation field at any location, is the ratio between the time spent by the subject at that location and the time spent by all individuals including the subject at the same location. If instantaneous sampling was used, frequencies of occurrence at a given location are substituted to total periods of time. This ration varies from 1, when the subject has exclusive use of the location, to zero, when it never uses the location but others do. Isolation fields are obtained for each individual and thus describe their pattern of exclusive use, and in combination with activity fields and information on resource distribution within the studied area, can give good indications on the degree to which each individual monopolizes access to resources. Individual isolation fields are thus obtained by comparing the activity field of one individual to the total activity field of the group or at least focussed individuals.

Aggression field

Wiley (1973) proposed the measurement of a third field, the aggression field. As we know, an individual's reaction to an approaching conspecific depends on several factors such as the state of the reacting individual, the identity and apparent state of the approaching individual, the distance separating the two and the absolute location of the encounter. The concept of an aggressive field can help to understand the influence of several of these determinants if they are known to the researcher. The value of an individual's aggression field at any location is defined by the proportions found there of attacks or retreats initiated by the concerned individual. By noting in which quadrats are situated both aggressive interactors, it becomes possible to obtain the aggression field for a focal animal; also, information about the absolute location of the encounter, the proximity of actors from each other or from a fixed resources, as well as the identity of the target individual can be obtained by partitioning the original observations. I am not aware of any work published having measured in detail the aggression field as defined by Wiley (1973). Perhaps van Iersel (1958) came closest by determining the decline of aggressive behaviour of male sticklebacks toward a standard opponent as distance from the subject's nest increased. In some way, the aggression field of Wiley (1973) is an operational definition of McBride's personal field. The measurement of individual aggression fields is of particular relevance to researchers interested in social and space requirements in industrial cages as well as in the disposition of water nipples and feeding‑trough. One can also imagine several other specific behavioural fields based on the ratio of presumed opposed tendencies, such as cooperation versus rivalry.   Inter‑individual spatial relations.  How are the individual's activity, isolation and aggression fields related to those of its neighbours? How can we say that the concerned field is not random? There are several ways to answer these questions. Some are presented by Waser and Wiley (1979). The only thing I can do here is to explain the essential of some of these techniques.

 Dispersion of individuals

Methods for measuring the instantaneous dispersion of individuals, particularly those based on nearest‑neighbour distances are well known and were imported from plant ecology. By comparing the distribution of nearest‑neighbour distances with that expected from a set of randomly positioned points, groups or populations can be classified as over dispersed (when close spacing is more frequent than expected by chance alone), random or aggregated (when close spacing is less frequent than predicted by a uniform distribution). 

Independence of movements

In some cases it is relevant to know whether two individuals or two groups of individuals are attracted to each other or avoid systematically. If inter‑individual or intergroup distances are sampled at regular time intervals, the relative probabilities of approach or withdrawal can be calculated as a function of intergroup or inter‑individual distance (Waser, 1976). These data can be contrasted to specific hypotheses predicting frequencies of encounters to a specified separation by using, for example, a statistical model of a perfect gas having known density and velocity (refer to Waser and Wiley, 1979 for full details). Other statistical techniques are also available. Essentially, comparison of observed and expected frequencies of approach at given distances can determine whether or not avoidance occurs, as well as the radius of avoidance, if such a radius exists (Waser, 1975b, 1976).

 

Spatial overlap

    The simple measure of the spatial relationships of activity fields is the percentage of individual home range overlap. Indices of overlap that takes intensity of use into account should include measures of overlap in the use of quadrats of the activity fields concerned. A numerically simple index was suggested by Holmes and Pitelka (1968) based on differences in proportions of use of each quadrat.  Another is Pianka's measure of overlap (Pianka, 1975). But, the only index of overlap so far used for intensities of quadrat frequentation is the Pearson product‑moment coefficient of correlation.  Similar indexes can be calculated for individual isolation fields.

 

Group configuration

The concepts of activity, isolation, and aggression fields can at most serve to process and to condense original observations. They have more in common with matrices and summary tables than with concepts which are part of theories. In other words, they are instrumental concepts referring to ways of condensing observations; they do not even point to forms of regularities and, still less, they do not have any explanatory pretension as the concept of territoriality did, at least implicitly. This might be a reason why these metrological concepts cannot replace the concept of territoriality. Only refined data are subjected to interpretation and only such refined information can be fed into a theory in order to test it or to derive further data. There are several other instruments which can be very useful to visualize global tendencies when it comes to the comparison of several "fields" from different subjects. Multidimensional scaling is one of them. Multidimensional scaling, or MDS for short, is a set of mathematical techniques that enable the researcher to uncover the "hidden structure" in data. It is simple matter to take a map and to fill an entry in a table of distances between two cities. One just applies a rule on the map and multiplies by the scale of the map. Now, suppose you only have the distances between cities, as is the case with research results from which the researcher wants to obtain a spatial configuration taking into accounts proximities between individuals. The map can be easily obtained with MDS, even though measures contain considerable noise due, for example, to repeated measurement under non optimal conditions. In addition, a map can be obtained from proximities or distances for which it is not known in advance whether a two‑ or three‑dimensional representation will be adequate. A solution using a least‑square monotonic regression is most often used in order to obtain the best configuration that fits the original data. Results obtained from recent experimental work on fish can serve to illustrate the application of MDS to spacing patterns. In a recent research (Beaugrand et al., 1985), 16 populations, each of 4 male and 4 female green swordtail fish were observed in 54 litre tanks separated into two unequal volumes by a partition allowing swimming from one volume to another only at the surface. Each population was observed on 2‑4 occasions, making a combined total of 50 observation periods of 2 hours each. Each aquarium was gridded into 12 sectors and 8 samples of instantaneous positions were taken each day at 15 minutes intervals. The tridimensional coordinate of the position of each individual were simply noted. A distance matrix was obtained for each sample by taking the differences between the positions of each pair of individuals in the tank and by transforming these differences into distances by the application of the theorem of Pythagoras. These upper right half matrices of inter-individual distances, one for each sample, 8 per period of observation, for 50 periods, had to be summarized in some way to reveal the general (spatial) configuration of the group. MDS was applied to these matrices and a one‑dimensional representation realized a satisfactory stress of 0.10. A three‑dimensional representation is presented in the next Figure for the sake of visual clarity (final stress of 0.002).


The obtained configuration supports the following social and spatial regularity that was, anyhow, confirmed by more conventional manners: the alpha male and the four females form a first group in the large compartment of the tank, while the three subordinate males form a second group in the small compartment. This spacing‑out pattern emerged with neat regularity from the data and was apparently caused and maintained by aggressive behaviour, especially by charges, initiated by the alpha male toward male rivals. However, it is clear that the behaviour of the alpha male should not qualify as territorial defence, since specific‑area‑linked dominance was never realized in this study. Moreover, spatial proximities between the various males and females in this study correspond perfectly with epigamic proximities between the males and the females, and with agonistic distances among the various males. Epigamic proximities were obtained by weighing frequencies of sexual displays initiated by the males toward the females; epigamic behaviours such as copulation attempts were given more weight than others such as sexual pursuits at a distance. It was found that the alpha male was responsible to 80% of all sexual activity and had privilege to behaviour leading to insemination with a high probability in 85% of the cases. In that sense, the alpha male was much more in proximity of the various females than the other males. When a similar weighing system was applied to agonistic behaviour among the males, agonistic distances obtained between males corresponded to the distances that had been obtained from repeated sampling for spatial positions. The same experiment was carried out with two compartments having the same volume and essentially the same regularities were obtained with the following exception: the spatial association of the alpha male with the females was found to be site independent.    

                                                          APPENDIX 2

Sociosystem

A set of socially linked or connected animals can be considered as a sociosystem. Social links, bonds and connections are special cases of social relations, but unlike a mere relation, a connection makes some difference to the thing to which it is related. If a link holds between two individuals, then at least one of them will behave differently from the way he/she would behave if not so coupled. When a connection affects two group members, it implies that one of them, or both (reciprocally), act upon the other and can, potentially at least, modify the latter's behavioural trajectory. This is the basic notion of behavioural influence. A sociosystem also includes connections with the environment; its immediate environment or milieu (i.e., the composition of the next supersystem) must be included in the description of a sociosystem because the behaviour of the members of the micro group depends critically on the nature of the immediate milieu. In addition, members of the group use, exploit and transform elements of their immediate environment. So, it should be clear that social structure (internal, between members) and ecosociological structure (external, between members and elements of the environment) are inter‑dependent.

What elicits the formation of a sociosystem and keeps it together despite somewhat (apparent, see the sociobiologists) divergent interests of its members ? The social structure can be considered as the result of a balance of forces that act in opposed directions: cooperation (mutuality) between group‑members tends to social cohesion and competition between them, to social dispersion. 

Cooperation can be said to occur when members in a group of socially connected individuals share goods for defence against predation, in order to increase their foraging efficiency, or to ease reproduction between mates, for mutual defence against parasites and infestations (Wittenberger, 1981). More schematically, if a and b are animals, then a and b cooperate with one another iff the social behaviour of each is valuable to the other or to a third animal. A thing is said to be valuable when it contributes to the degree of health of the individual. When cooperation concerns things (e.g. goods) of some kind, it is called sharing, and participation when it concerns activities. But cooperation may take the elementary form of being together at the same time and at the same place. Being two may have deterrent effects on predation. But, cooperation is only possible when the gains obtained from simply being together, from mutualism, sharing and social life override their costs (Wilson,1975; Barash, 1982; Wittenberger, 1981; Hinde, 1982; Deag, 1977). On the other hand, competition can be said to occur when one individual in a sociosystem does not share goods and does not participate in social activities because these goods or activities are more valuable consumed or practised individually than shared, or more valued when not obtained or practised at all. Competition may take the mild form of indifference for activities that else would be more adaptive when done cooperatively, of parasitism, of over‑exploitation of fundamental resources at the expense of others. In extreme cases, it takes the form of direct interference with exploitation or practice done by others, with or without the aid of aggressive behaviour. Competition is repulsive and highly dispersive in nature, both socially and spatially and temporarily. Individuals compete for food, shelters, females, sites for reproduction, &c.

The social or internal structure among group‑members can be considered as the result of cooperative and competitive forces acting in opposed directions. When the balance is neatly in favour of cooperation, group structures exist; no cooperation, no sociosystems. A set of conspecific animals forms a social system if (and only if) each of them cooperates (on the average) with some other members of the same set. The supremacy of cooperation over competition contributes directly to the tightening of links between individuals; connections between members are attractive and strong and it can be said that the degree of integration is high. If the links are still positive but weak, due to the small supremacy of cooperation over competition in a group, the degree of integration is low. However, if the links are very repulsive, there is no systemicity or integration at all. The highest level of integration corresponds to no differentiation: all individuals are equivalent. But this is an extreme case since there are always elements of competition in a group, and there are differences between individuals in competitive abilities. The lowest level of integration corresponds to complete differentiation, for example, in a territorial situation where individuals do not participate to a society. However, intermediate levels of integration or differentiation exist, for ex., in a true straight‑line hierarchy or even in despotism.

The balance between cooperation and competition has profound effects on the spatial structure or configuration of the sociosystem. By definition, space is an element of any social system: the configuration or spatial structure is a subset of the internal environment relating some of the system's components by contact and distance. The living individuals part of the group stand in definite spatial relations to one another. Moreover, spatial relationships can be used by them to create and reinforce connections among themselves. Hence, as stressed by Zayan et al. (1983), in the context of social activities, participation of individuals in a common activity such as feeding, copulation, rest, mutual preening, flocking, mobbing and group defence against predation, implies mutual tolerance both spatially and chronologically, namely synchronism and sharing of objects that stand in the same immediate space. Cooperation implies proximity. On the contrary, competition implies spatiotemporal incompatibility, particularly in the execution of individually valuable activities. While cooperation and participation imply decrease of inter‑individual distances and cohesion, spacing‑out is the rule when competition overrides cooperation. Individuals do not share the same places, avoid encountering each others, get desynchronized spatiotemporalily. Ultimately, extreme competition can lead to complete differentiation, to complete disconnection from the social structure, as in group expulsion and emigration, and to the formation of a territorial system. 

So, social, spatial and temporal organizations are networks of relations existing between individuals, objects and resources of the milieu whose function is to optimize the partitioning of resources and necessities of life and reproduction.

 

Plasticity of sociosystems

A given sociosystem is capable of much plasticity in its social organization. Eco‑ethology has tried, with some success, to explain much of the diversity of animal social systems as adaptive consequences. But, while this variation in social systems among species confirms the central predictions of eco‑ethology, it nevertheless contradicts one of its basic premises according to which the social system of a given species is a fixed product of natural selection (Lott, 1984). One has to recognize that, for a given species, social predispositions are selected rather than social systems per se (Mason, 1978). Instances of intra‑specific variations in the social systems are rather the rule than the exception and this plasticity suggests that in many species selection has produced a predisposition that can have more than one social system outcome, depending on the individual history and current circumstances. For example, coyotes within a single population may defend pair territories, live in a nomadic fashion, or form a well-organized pack (Bekoff and Wells, 1980). Chars in a single pool may share the defence of a group territory around a reed bed at one side of the pool, contribute to a hierarchy at the pool entrance, defend individual partial territories in rotation, or even be transient from pool to pool without making any social association in each pool visited (Jenkins, 1969). But, genuine territoriality, as would have been indicated by the presence of territorial mosaics, was never observed in adults chars. Similarly, the presence of congeners of the opposite sex may have profound effects on the social structure of a group of animals. Roosters and hens form hierarchies when placed in isosexual groups (i.e. with individuals of the same sexual gender). But, when hens are introduced to roosters already forming a hierarchy, despotism appear and a harem is formed around the most dominant male. Very similar results are obtained with green swordtail fishes (Xiphophorus helleri) kept in tanks separated into two communicating compartments (Beaugrand et al., 1985). Intra‑specific plasticity in social organization permits animals to efficiently exploit momentary situations produced by increase or decrease of intra‑specific or inter‑specific competition, climatic changes and habitat deterioration, prey increase or decrease, increase or decrease of predation, etc. In environmental conditions changing rapidly and frequently, intra‑specific plasticity of social system should be favoured. It has also been recognized by several authors that the concept of territoriality had much in common with dominance. Both may be given a behavioural definition in terms of overt aggressive interactions giving way to a certain form of precedence of one individual over another. In each form of organization, there exists a mechanism permitting relative stability in the precedence over resources, without the necessity of repeated overt fighting whenever a resource might be contested. Individual recognition plays that role of a convention for sure in a hierarchical system (Beaugrand and Zayan, 1985; Beaugrand et al., 1985) and is also most probably at work when territories are adjacent, as attested by the "dear enemy phenomenon". When territories are not adjacent, conflicts can be solved according to other conventions. In a dominance hierarchy, an individual has privileged access to resources regardless of their location within a group territory or home‑range. With territorial organization, different individuals have priority of access to resources depending on their location. Territoriality is thus a form of locus dependent dominance. Dominance orders and territorial organization can be seen to grade into each other in some ways rather than to exist as absolute alternatives. Several species have been observed to adopt a territorial organization at low population densities, but they shift to a hierarchical organization when population densities increase. Wilson (1975) has qualified this shift of "behavioural scaling". It may be more appropriate to call it intra‑specific variation in social system (Lott, 1984). It may have a genetic basis and may permit animals to adopt different organizations according to environmental conditions. Noble (1939) and Greenberg (1947) had several years ago recognized the interference of dominance hierarchies and the use of space in fish. They had identified two kinds of territory in fish: the territorial mosaic and partial territory. The territorial mosaic corresponded to the situation where each adjacent territory holder was dominant over its own territory but submitted when on an adjacent territory. This situation of reversibility satisfies the definition of true territoriality as defined previously. In the case of partial territory, "nip right" dominance hierarchy superimposed over territorial organization in such a way that residents were successful in defending their territory against subordinates but submitted to a dominant intruder. Both forms of territorial organizations could be found in the same species, at different phases of their life. In several species of Salmonidae, pars and juveniles holding adjacent stations can be said to organize in the form of territorial mosaics. As suggested by Jenkins (1969), such a neat partitioning of space can be explained by the rather uniform sizes, and possibly, level of aggression of the fishes, uniform substratum conditions and minima displacements over the substratum. When heterogeneity in size, more mobility and other asymmetries appear, minimal conditions for the formation of dominance orders are present, and partial territories can be formed. Partial territories seem to persist throughout adult life in some trout species except during the reproductive seasons where couples may defend small adjacent sites (territorial mosaics) on river beds in which eggs are to be deposited. Patterns of social organization are thus extremely diverse, and may vary within a species according to phases of their life, and according to sexes. True territoriality, dominance orders, despotism, flocking‑schooling, coloniality and lekking are alternative adaptive social systems. They are the most appropriate solutions for a given species in a given situation, for efficient exploitation of alimentary resources, coping with intra‑ and inter‑specific competition, defence against predation, mate choice and fecundation, parental care, defence against infectious diseases, and also protection against the physical environment (e.g. strong currents). They vary within a single species and even according to sexes within a species (e.g. females do not lek, males do not take care of the young). Individuals involved in environmental circumstances will manifest one type of organization when it is economically (i.e. energetically) justified and physically possible but shift to other types when either of those conditions does not hold. To each form of social organization correspond one or several forms of spacing and distancing. The utilization of space is, by definition, tied to resources that stand in definite positions with regard to competitors, and social organization is partitioning of these according to a balance resulting from cooperative and competitive forces.

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